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Structural Holes, CEOs, and 
Informational Monopolies 
THE MISSING LINK IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE* 
             
Lawrence E. Mitchell†  
Where was the board? This is the question that has 
resounded throughout the business and scholarly communities, 
as well as the public more broadly, as scandals from Enron to 
WorldCom and more have come to light over the last several 
years. Traditional corporate governance scholarship, as well as 
generally accepted legal principles, tell us that the board is the 
ultimate corporate monitor, the failsafe for managerial 
excesses and the circuit breaker in times of corporate crisis.1 
But case after case of corporate scandal, as well as garden-
variety stockholder litigation, reveals that boards were 
  
 * © 2005 Lawrence E. Mitchell. All Rights Reserved. 
 † John Theodore Fey Research Professor of Law, The George Washington 
University. My thanks go to Bernie Black, Bill Bratton, Ron Burt, Claire Moore 
Dickerson, Allen Kaufman, Don Langevoort, Marleen O’Connor, Mike Selmi, and Dalia 
Tsuk. 
 1 See, e.g., Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance after Enron and Global 
Crossing: Comparative Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. L. J. 723, 725-
29 (2003); Richard S. Booth, Form and Function in Business Organizations, 58 BUS. 
LAW. 1433, 1448 (2003); Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 
Bus. Law. 461, 527 (1992); Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance 
Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1987); see generally Robert W. Hamilton, 
Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes But Uncertain Benefits, 
25 J. CORP. L. 349 (2000); ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).  
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unaware of internal corporate misbehavior until matters 
reached the point of crisis.2 
The board may not be the culprit. Many of the scandals, 
such as CEO Dennis Kozlowski’s use of Tyco as his personal 
piggybank, senior executives and the CEO of WorldCom’s 
fictionalized financial statements, Andy Fastow’s enormous 
profits at Enron’s expense under CEO Jeff Skilling, and a host 
of shareholder suits, suggest that the board may have been 
ignorant of what was occurring in the corporation beneath 
them, not necessarily because they weren’t doing their jobs, but 
because they were unable to do their jobs. The relevant 
information was hidden from them or falsified. The implication 
is that often it was senior executives, and especially the CEO, 
who were at fault—not the board.3  
  
 2 Obviously, boards in litigation over corporate scandals have a conflict of 
interest with CEOs and other corporate managers who they are likely to blame, and 
claim their own ignorance, which poses some problem of their credibility. But the issue 
of inadequately informed boards has been sufficiently common through modern 
corporate history that substantial board ignorance of managerial shenanigans seems 
like a reasonable assumption. 
 3 Certainly from the criminal perspective of these scandals it is the CEO and 
senior executives who are being indicted and convicted, not the board. See, e.g., Press 
Release, United States Dep’t of Justice, Four Former Qwest Communications 
Executives Indicted for Fraud (Feb. 25, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
opa/pr/2003/February/03_crm_112.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005) (announcing the 
indictment of four executives at Qwest Communications, including Qwest’s former 
Chief Financial Officer for Qwest’s Global Business Unit; a senior vice president, 
another vice president, and Qwest’s assistant controller). 
  TYCO: This February, the former Chief Financial Officer of Tyco 
International, Mark H. Swartz, was indicted on tax evasion charges. The indictment 
alleges that Swartz illegally evaded nearly $5 million in personal federal income taxes. 
Brooke A. Masters, Tyco Official Indicted on More Charges, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2003, 
at E4. 
  DYNEGY: In January, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of 
Texas obtained a seven-count indictment charging Michelle Maria Valencia, a former 
senior natural gas trader with Dynegy Marketing and Trade, with filing bogus reports 
to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that are used to calculate the “index” 
price of natural gas. Record Home Sales, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2003, at E2. 
  EL PASO: In Houston last December, a federal grand jury returned an 
indictment against Todd Geiger, an energy trader at El Paso Corporation, on charges of 
falsely reporting price information to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and 
wire fraud as part of a scheme to manipulate energy prices. Productivity, Services 
Grow, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2002, at E2. 
  MERCURY FINANCE: In December, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
Northern District of Illinois obtained an indictment of Bradley Vallem, the former 
treasurer of the now-defunct Mercury Finance Company, on bank fraud and wire fraud 
charges in connection with his participation in a scheme to overstate revenue and hide 
losses of more than $30 million. John Schmeltzer, Mercury Finance ex-CEO indicted; 
Lawyer says Client to Plead Not Guilty, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 2005, at C1. 
  COMMERCIAL FINANCIAL SERVICES: In December, the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
for the Northern District of Oklahoma and the Justice Department’s Criminal Division 
obtained the indictment of Commercial Financial Services’ former CEO William 
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This is particularly striking in light of the fact that 
corporate governance scholarship, at least since the time of 
Berle and Means, has focused on the board as the corporate 
constituent best situated to manage or monitor the 
corporation’s affairs and overcome the intrinsic conflict of 
interest that arises when corporate managers have access to 
the shareholders’ money. That scholarship, as well as a variety 
of reform efforts and a substantial amount of case law, has 
viewed board structure as the solution to what has become 
known, for the last thirty years, as the “agency problem” in 
corporate governance.4 
Drawing on economic sociology, I argue that corporate 
law reform efforts have focused on the wrong actors: while the 
law’s principal interest is board governance, it should instead 
focus on the CEO and how the relationship between internal 
corporate structures and board structures provide 
opportunities for misconduct.5 While the CEO is important to 
the initial inquiry, the real problem goes even deeper; the focus 
of corporate law should be on the CEO and the entire senior 
  
Bartmann for mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud and money laundering. Fallen Firm’s 
CEO Faces Fraud Claims in Federal Indictment, CHI TRIB., Dec. 13, 2002, at D3.  
  INFORMIX: In November, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern 
District of California obtained the indictment of former Informix CEO Phillip White on 
charges of securities, mail and wire fraud in connection with financial accounting fraud 
at the database software company. Matt Richtel, Finding Wrongs, Through the Prism 
of Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2002, at C1. 
  PEREGRINE SYSTEMS: In November, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
Southern District of California obtained the conviction by guilty plea of Ilse Cappel, an 
assistant treasurer at Peregrine Systems, a San Diego software company. Cappel 
pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to commit bank fraud. Don Bauder, White-
Collar Crimes Won’t Elude Justice, SAN DIEGO TRIB., Nov. 23, 2002, at C1. 
  ENRON: Four former Enron employees and former Arthur Andersen 
accountant David Duncan have pleaded guilty to various charges and are cooperating 
with investigators. Former Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow has been indicted 
on 78 counts, and three former British bankers have been indicted in connection with 
an Enron deal. 2002 Will Be Remembered as the Year Executives Paid the Price for 
Cooking Their Books, Wall Street Shame, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, at E1. 
 4 See Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corprate 
Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 898 (1996); A.L.I., 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §3A.01 
(1992). See also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 5 Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker understand the role of CEO power in the 
context of compensation issues. See Lucien Ayre Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and 
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753-
61 (2002); LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Donald C. Langevoort, 
The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended 
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 797-802 (2001) 
(explaining the source of bargaining defects in analyzing the role of the CEO in relation 
to board structure). 
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management structure of the corporation, examining the 
relationship of that structure to the board’s ability to perform. 
Questions of whether the board should manage or monitor,6 
whether its role is political,7 whether it should be concerned 
with the provision of resources as the most efficient way to 
limit agency costs,8 or as a mediator of team production,9 
whether the board is subject to structural bias,10 whether it is 
reliable because of its members conflicting interests,11 or 
whether the board is subject to the perils of groupthink,12 all 
take a back seat to this fundamental structural question. 
Focusing on the board without paying attention to these 
structural characteristics of the corporation will not change the 
status quo, no matter how dramatic the reforms.13 
I have based my conclusion on the combination of two 
interrelated hypotheses, which, taken together, offer powerful 
insight into the role of corporate structure. They are:   
1. Corporations that have inside boards will have a 
weak CEO (one who is dominated by the board); and 
2. Corporations that have independent boards will have 
a strong CEO (one who dominates the board). 
  
 6 See Hamilton, supra note 1. 
 7 See Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Do Some Outside Directors Play 
a Political Role?, 44 J.L. & ECON. 179 (2001). 
 8 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976).  
 9 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999).  
 10 See James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsingner, Bias in the Boardroom: 
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 84-85 (1985).  
 11 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983).  
 12 See Marleen O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2002-2003). 
 13 Leading corporation law treatises and casebooks make little or no mention 
of CEOs and other senior officers except for discussion of the sources and scope of their 
authority. See, e.g., JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: 
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (5th ed. 2003); JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS (1997); 
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW (2000); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, 
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 
2000); WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 2003). Atypical is a brief 
discussion of the practical role of the CEO in modern corporate practice in ROBERT W. 
HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 
INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 701-05 (8th ed. 2003). 
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While I acknowledge that these hypotheses are contrary 
to virtually all legal wisdom on the subject,14 the theoretical 
construct I present suggests their power. Assuming my 
hypotheses are correct, the traditional scholarly focus on the 
board without attention to the CEO and senior management is 
  
 14 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: 
Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 810 (2002) (“[T]he Delaware courts take 
the board’s distinct role quite seriously, especially with respect to its independent 
members.”); James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: 
Empowering the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077 
(2003) (“The important role that independent directors have in monitoring and 
managing conflicts of interest reflects our societal commitment to the power of the 
outside director. . . . Today, in the post-Enron era, the outside director continues to be 
the focus of corporate governance reforms.”); Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of 
Boards of Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781, 787 (2003) (“Perhaps the most 
significant trend in board governance in the United States in the last twenty years has 
been the increase in the number and proportion of outside directors . . . .”). Dallas 
proposes a two-tiered board model with a mixed board and outside board that, while 
this paper does not endorse at the moment, does intuit some of the conclusions I reach. 
Delaware Chancellor William Chandler recently has expressed his view that courts 
should not “rely reflexively” on a director’s status as inside or independent in according 
deference or not, but rather should take matters case by case. William B. Chandler III, 
On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1083 (1999).  
  The principal area in which legal scholars and, especially, economists, have 
noticed the increased power of the CEO is in the realm of compensation. Bebchuk et al., 
supra note 5, at 766; Robert A. Lambert et al., The Structure of Organizational 
Incentives, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 438 (1993); Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, The Board 
of Directors, and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 4 
INDUS. AND CORP. CHANGE 293 (1995); Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive 
Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 847 (2002); Edward J. Zajac & James D. Westphal, Accounting for the 
Explanations of CEO Compensation: Substance and Symbolism, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 283 
(1995). These studies generally focus on market imperfections relating to the failure of 
outside boards and consulting firms to understand the true cost of options. See, e.g., 
Murphy, supra. They fail to understand the critical importance of structure which, if 
misaligned, can hamstring even the most sophisticated boards and consultants. But see 
Ann K. Buchholtz et al., Are Board Members Pawns or Watchdogs?, 23 GROUP & ORG. 
MGMT. 6 (1998) (finding correlations between increased CEO strength and increased 
board strength). 
  There have been dissenting voices from time to time over the wisdom of 
independent boards as a general reform solution, some of which acknowledges the role 
of the CEO in either manipulating or otherwise disempowering independent boards. 
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate 
Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034 (1993) (questioning the value—at 
least the universal value—of independent directors); Victor Brudney, The Independent 
Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982); Jill E. 
Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265 (1997); Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1282 (1982); Roberta S. 
Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?, 52 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 535 (1984) (questioning the monitoring model of the board based on outside 
directors proposed by the ALI); Langevoort, supra note 5. The explanations as to the 
uncertain benefits of independent boards vary. The virtue of the approach I take is its 
theoretical coherence. I recognize, at the same time, that theoretical coherence may 
result in oversimplification; qualifications to my theory are presented infra notes 111-
17 and accompanying text.  
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misdirected. At the very least, my hypotheses suggest that 
advocacy of independent boards,15 which has been the trend 
over the last thirty years,16 is simply wrongheaded.17  
This focus on the board has led corporate law scholars 
(with several notable exceptions18) to ignore the extraordinary 
increase in CEO power.19 Focusing on corporate structure leads 
us to conclude that the increase in CEO power is the result of 
increasing board independence.20 At the same time, evidence 
  
 15 Standard terminology divides directors into three categories: inside 
directors, who are officers of the company, affiliated directors (or “gray directors”), who 
have some business relationship with the company (investment bankers and lawyers 
are typical examples), and independent directors, who have no relationship with the 
company other than their service as directors. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The 
Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. 
CORP. L. 231, 239 (2002). My argument focuses principally on the problem of 
independent directors, although affiliated directors suffer from problems similar to the 
ones I shall examine if to a lesser degree. 
 16 Bhagat and Black describe the “conventional wisdom” that only 
independent directors can be effective monitors. Bhagat & Black, supra note 15, at 232. 
The advocacy of this “conventional wisdom” has led to regulatory and quasi-regulatory 
requirements of increased outside directors, most recently the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, which requires outside directors on the audit 
committee, and the New York Stock Exchange’s well-publicized rule revisions which 
require listed corporations to have a majority of outside directors. New York Stock 
Exchange, Corporate Rule Proposals Reflecting Recommendations from the NYSE 
Report of the Exchange Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee as 
Approved by the NYSE Board of Directors, Aug. 1, 2002, § 303, at A1. 
 17 Certainly this is the implication of Bhagat and Black’s work. Bhagat & 
Black, supra note 15, at 233. 
 18 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 783-95; Langevoort, supra note 5. 
 19 Westphal, in an empirical study, concludes that CEOs have developed 
behavioral patterns that counteract the greater potential board control associated with 
board independence. See James D. Westphal, Board Games: How CEOs Adapt to 
Increases in Structural Board Independence From Management, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 511, 
529-31 (1998). Klein, consistent with other studies, finds little relationship between 
corporate performance and board structure. However, consistent with the argument I 
present here, she does note that the presence of insiders on finance and investment 
committees is correlated with superior corporate performance, consistent with the 
notion that insiders provide valuable information to the board. April Klein, Firm 
Performance and Board Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275 (1998). Robert W. 
Hamilton argues that in the 1950s much of the work of the board was done by the 
CEO. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 349-50. 
  To a limited extent, the recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act seems to 
intuit the importance of the CEO, requiring his certification of the corporation’s 
financial statements and thereby increasing his incentives for integrity and careful 
monitoring through the device of federal sanctions for his failure. This seems more 
sensitive to the identity of the real culprits in the corporate scandals that led to the 
Act’s passage, but it doesn’t really follow through on the implications of this intuition. 
Moreover, following traditional reform approaches, it also places great importance on 
the board, and particularly the importance of an independent audit committee. 
 20 Bebchuk, Fried and Walker acknowledge the increase in recent years in 
the number and power of independent directors. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 773. 
That the level of the CEO’s power can be seen as along a continuum should not be 
surprising. “Organizations are information processors,” and the critical variable is the 
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shows that the increasing independence of boards has, 
predictably, decreased trust between CEOs and boards.21  
The wisdom of board independence has come under 
serious question. Bhagat and Black, in an important empirical 
study, examine a thirty year trend toward greater board 
independence during which “the composition of public company 
boards of directors has changed radically . . . .”22 This study 
provides striking evidence that independent boards not only 
fail to improve corporate performance, they may in fact make it 
worse.23 While Bhagat and Black speculate as to the causes of 
this phenomenon, by their own admission they are unable to 
fully explain it, and continue to suggest remedies that focus on 
board reform.  
The theory set forth here does explain the phenomenon 
observed by Bhagat and Black. In Part I of this article, I will 
explain the significance of my theory to corporate law reform 
efforts. Parts II and III will explicate the underlying theory. 
Part IV will demonstrate how my hypotheses explain the direct 
  
CEO’s position in the networks of information flows. See Nitin Nohria & James D. 
Berkley, The Virtual Organization: Bureaucracy, Technology, and the Implosion of 
Control, in THE POST-BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 108, 118 (Charles Hecksher & Anne Donnellon eds., 1994) 
 21 Ranjay Gulati & James D. Westphal, Cooperative or Controlling? The 
Effects of CEO-Board Relations and the Content of Interlocks on the Formation of Joint 
Ventures, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 473, 477-79 (1999); In one of the relatively few law review 
articles to challenge the conventional wisdom, Donald C. Langevoort argues that 
increased board independence decreases trust and interferes with effective 
communication. Langevoort, supra note 5, at 800. Westphal’s findings of manipulative 
CEO behavior certainly justify this lack of trust on the part of the board. Westphal, 
Board Games, supra note 19, at 530-31. 
 22 Bhagat & Black, supra note 15, at 238. They note that in 1970, there 
appeared to be on average 54% inside directors, 26% outside directors, and 20% 
independent directors in the sample set studied. By 1991, they report that the median 
corporation in their sample set of 934 of the largest corporations in the United States 
had 23% inside directors, 13% outside directors, and 64% independent directors. 
Finally, they note that by 1997, the mean number of inside directors at Fortune 500 
corporations was 2, and that 56% of the S&P 500 firms “had only one or two inside 
directors.” Id. at 238. The trend is rather clear. 
 23 Id. See also Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and 
Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders, 31 J. 
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALALYSIS 377 (1996) (for an earlier study suggesting that too 
many outsiders correlate with poorer corporate performance); Sanjai Bhagat & 
Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999) (literature survey showing inconclusive evidence 
of the effect of independent boards); April Klein, Firm Performance and Board 
Committee Structure, 41 J.L. AND ECON. 275 (1998) (concluding that independent board 
committees don’t improve corporate performance). For an earlier survey of studies 
concluding that different kinds of directors make a difference in given situations, see 
also Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors As a Corporate Governance 
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898 (1996). 
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relationship between increased board independence and CEO 
power, and Part V will discuss the extent to which managers a 
level or two below the CEO might also be in a structural 
position to manipulate both the board and the CEO.  
Following this discussion, Part VI will address a second 
independent variable that might have an important magnifying 
effect on CEO power: the bureaucratic organization of the 
corporation itself. While corporate reformers have been 
advocating independent boards, important changes in 
corporate structure have taken place. Large public 
corporations, once rigidly hierarchical, have, at least in some 
industries (and sometimes within industries), substantially 
shifted to more horizontal management systems. This 
horizontal management structure magnifies the strength of the 
CEO, whether the board is an inside board or an independent 
one. Because this conclusion is still tentative, however, I 
reserve this discussion for the end of the article. Part VII will 
conclude with some possible directions for further research and 
reform. 
I. THE POWER OF THE THEORY 
My hypotheses derive from a subgenre of economic 
sociology and specifically a subgenre of network theory, known 
as the theory of structural holes.24 I will reserve a more detailed 
explanation of structural hole theory for the next section. For 
now, I will briefly define and illustrate structural holes and 
suggest why structural hole theory holds such great promise 
for corporate scholarship, even as it reveals the importance of 
focusing on internal corporate structures.25 
  
 24 Network analysis is a genre of sociology that, contrary to typical 
sociological analysis which begins from studies of individuals and classifies them into 
social structures by grouping their characteristics, instead begins with the structure as 
the unit of analysis, representing social structures as networks and actors as nodes 
within those networks, in order to identify the constraints on individual behavior 
arising from the social structure. BARRY WELLMAN & S.D. BERKOWITZ, SOCIAL 
STRUCTURES: A NETWORK APPROACH 3, 4 (1988).  
 25 Let me make it clear at the outset that the theory I am applying is an 
adaptation of the essential aspects of structural hole theory. Structural hole theory, as 
presented by Burt, while an intuitively apparent idea, has enormously complexity and 
applicability, and Burt ranges from explanations of market behavior to a theory of the 
firm to a theory of personality. The adaptation of the theory I apply takes the basic 
defining aspects of structural holes and implicitly combines it with Granovetter’s weak 
ties theory (to which it is intimately related) for the purpose of creating a hybrid theory 
that allows us to take a broad view of corporate structure and its potential deformities.  
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To understand structural holes, one must begin with the 
proposition that people are socially organized into distinct 
networks. Sometimes networks overlap through common 
members. Sometimes they are completely distinct, with no ties 
to each other. When two networks are distinct and lack ties to 
each other, the gap between them is a structural hole. The 
structural hole provides an opportunity for a person to 
establish contact with each of the two networks, bridging the 
structural hole and giving him or herself informational and 
control advantages.  
Think, for example, of a university’s anthropology 
department and its sociology department. Assume that the 
departments are relatively small, and that the members of the 
respective departments know each other reasonably well, at 
least as colleagues. Each department is a single network. Its 
members have significant professional and, perhaps, social ties 
to one another. It is likely, however, given the nature of the two 
disciplines, that at least several members of each department 
will know each other well. The two networks overlap through 
these associations, and while this does not destroy the integrity 
of each department as a network, it does connect the networks 
so that no structural holes exist. This connection provides 
members of each department who are unacquainted with 
members of the other department with some substantial 
information (gossip or scholarly) about what is going on in the 
other department, through colleagues who bridge the networks.  
Now consider the same university’s physics department 
and its law school. As with the preceding example, each 
division of the university forms a network. It is unlikely (with 
the possible exception of chance acquaintance on university 
committees or relationships off campus) that any of the 
members of the physics department and any of the members of 
the law faculty know each other. The gap between these 
networks is a structural hole.  
There may be no reason for physics professors and law 
professors to bridge this gap. On the other hand, there might. 
Assume that women form a relatively small minority of each of 
the physics and law faculties. Next assume that the university 
neither provides on-site childcare nor provides child care 
subsidies. Further assume that most of the men on each faculty 
leave childcare principally to their wives and therefore don’t 
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view it as of particular concern.26 But some of the women do. 
However, these women do not form a sufficiently large 
constituency in either department to compel their respective 
faculties to act, or to challenge the university’s parsimony. A 
woman who is a member of the law faculty, forced to deal with 
this problem, can consciously make the effort to become 
acquainted with at least one woman on the physics faculty. She 
is now bridging the structural hole. The utility of such a bridge 
is obvious. Through her contact with the physics professor, the 
law professor unites the two networks (or in this case sub-
networks) of women faculty. By so doing, she is able to gauge 
the strength of the inchoate demand for childcare and, by 
joining the networks (particularly if the law professor repeats 
this effort in every department and school of the university), 
she may be able to compel the administration to act. This is one 
value of bridging structural holes. 
There is a negative side to structural holes too. Assume 
that no woman on the university faculty sees this structural 
hole opportunity. The only bridge among the different 
departments and schools is the university administration (and 
for sake of simplicity, let us identify the administration as the 
university president). If the women in the physics department 
approach the president and ask for child care relief without 
themselves bridging the structural hole, the president is in a 
position to play the faculties against each other to his or her 
advantage. He or she might, for example, threaten to cut a 
portion of the law school’s budget to pay for on-campus 
childcare because the physics department, which already has 
budgetary constraints, is demanding the service. The law 
school will object to having its budget cut to subsidize the 
physicists, even if the women law faculty might benefit. The 
president can then cite the law school’s protest to the physics 
department as a reason to deny child care benefits. As the sole 
bridge of the structural hole, the president can set the two 
sides off against each other. 
The president can also manipulate the situation by 
creating a structural hole that remains unfilled—in other 
words, by intentionally splitting two connected networks. For 
example, assume that the president sets up a management 
structure in which department heads and deans report only to 
  
 26  I realize this example is gendered but plead current social realities as a 
justification. 
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the provost, and that all university-wide faculty committees, 
whether ad hoc or formal, can gain audience only with the 
provost or one of his subordinates. The president delegates 
authority to the provost to make all decisions that come out of 
these reports, ensuring that the provost has a good sense of the 
president’s interests. By cutting off reporting from the provost, 
the president has created a structural hole between herself and 
the provost that is unfilled and, given her control and the 
university structure, unfillable. The provost can deny the 
request and there can be no appeal to the president. 
Of course every faculty member knows that such a 
situation, if enacted in the world of academia, would create an 
uproar that would make the president’s life miserable. I offer 
this example because it is simple and familiar. In the corporate 
context, to which I will later turn, such manipulation is much 
easier, for power is more clearly defined, less democratically 
wielded, and job termination is always a threat. For the 
moment, however, the foregoing should clarify the definition of 
structural holes and provide some insight into their utility. 
Figure One illustrates a structural hole bridged by you. 
 
Figure 1:   Structural Hole 
 
 
Structural hole theory was developed by Ronald Burt in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, culminating in Structural Holes,27 
its most comprehensive examination. Burt explains 
competition as a function of social structure by looking at the 
ways in which competitors can maximize their opportunities by 
  
 27 RONALD STATE BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF 
COMPETITION (1992). 
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manipulating to their advantage the social structures in which 
they operate. This contrasts with neoclassical economic 
analysis, which focuses on individual transactions and the 
wealth maximizing motivations of individuals. Structural hole 
theory is closely related to transaction cost economics,28 which 
explains the origin of organizations in, among other things, the 
desire to restrain opportunistic behavior arising from the 
neoclassical goal of diminished transaction costs.29 But it is 
richer than these theories because structural hole theory 
allows us to dispense with the unrealistic essentialized 
motivations of actors that characterize the competing theories 
as well as to broaden our perspective beyond the dyadic 
transaction.30 Instead, structural hole theory leads us to see 
competition as a process occurring within preexisting 
structures,31 obviating the need for unrealistic assumptions and 
situating the theory in the complexities of the world in which 
competition takes place.32 Structural hole theory treats the 
  
 28 Transaction cost economics, or “the new institutional economics,” finds its 
origin in Ronald Coase’s 1937 theory of the firm, Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 
4 ECONOMICA 385 (1937), and was developed most thoroughly by Oliver Williamson. 
OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975). 
 29 Williamson’s theory is considerably more complex than this, describing the 
origins of organization not only in terms of restraining opportunism but also as a result 
of conditions of uncertainty, asset specificity, bounded rationality, and the like. See 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 28, at 7. The analysis does focus on transaction cost reduction, 
however, and I focus on opportunism in the text because it is the aspect of Williamson’s 
concern most related to this paper.  
  Granovetter notes the undersocialized nature of Williamson’s theory as 
well as his over reliance on the power of hierarchy to restrain opportunism. Mark S. 
Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 
AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 481, 481-510 (1985). 
  Structural hole theory also has close relationship to resource dependence 
theory which is not especially relevant to my analysis. JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. 
SALANCIK, The External Control of Organizations (1978) is the ur-text on resource 
dependence theory.  
  To be sure, Burt takes great pains to show the consistency of his theory 
with transaction cost theory and resource dependency theory (and even traces some of 
his intellectual roots back to Coase) in his development of his theory of the firm. BURT, 
supra note 27, at 238-45. My characterization of the differences in the text that lead me 
to argue that structural hole theory is an improvement over these theories is my own, 
not Burt’s. 
 30 Williamson proclaims his unrelenting reliance on the transaction as the 
unit of analysis. WILLIAMSON, supra note 28, at 1-2. 
 31 To put it differently, for all of its sophistication in trying to come to grips 
with organizational structure and its sources and consequences, transaction cost theory 
remains mired in the unrealistic assumptions of neoclassical economics. 
 32 Burt himself, especially in his argument in Chapter Seven, sometimes 
seems to lapse into the same motivational assumptions (although he doesn’t describe 
them this way) as Coase and Williamson. Nevertheless, from a purely structural 
perspective, one can easily read his basic theory as dispensing with these assumptions 
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process of competition as a function of relations that are visible 
only by their absence—an absence we might refer to as gaps in 
the social structure. These gaps—these structural holes—allow 
actors within a social network the freedom to behave 
entrepreneurially (or opportunistically). As a general matter, 
the kinds of social networks most relevant to this discussion 
are networks of managers within the corporation. 
While there are many ways in which an actor in this 
context can manipulate the social structure, the kind of 
opportunism most relevant here is that of a manager placing 
herself in a position where she will maximize the likelihood of 
receiving information and the opportunity to disseminate it as 
she desires.33 
The freedom to behave opportunistically within social 
networks—including the social networks within corporations—
arises because they create circumstances of imperfect 
competition by placing given actors in advantaged positions (or 
creating opportunities for them to seize advantaged positions). 
Further, social networks structure these positions and the 
relations between other actors in such a way that movement 
for those who are not in advantaged positions is relatively 
difficult. (In economic terms, social structure introduces 
friction into the “market” so that competition is imperfect.) 
Circumstances of imperfect competition create opportunities 
for advantage. In practical terms, imperfect competition in this 
context means that some actors are “stuck” in place in the 
corporate hierarchy or are positionally situated to be 
constrained by other actors, while others, who have the ability 
to identify gaps in the structure, are free to move in and fill the 
gaps.34 This is most likely to be the case when a given actor 
performs the same (or largely the same) function as another 
actor. As I will later explain, in network terms, such actors are 
redundant—they have the same contacts—and so only one, if 
either, will be of use to an actor in an advantaged position and 
  
as he does on his own terms. See BURT, supra note 27. 
 33 See generally BURT, supra note 27, at ch. 4.  
 34 The use of the economic concept of imperfect competition here may be 
jarring to those who are used to seeing it used only in the context of markets. But 
competition can occur in other spheres of life as well and it is at least metaphorically, if 
not literally, useful to adopt the phrase to describe the circumstances under which 
social behavior within social networks takes place. I ask the reader to be careful, 
however, because I am using the term (and applying the theory) in the corporate 
context, which itself is an economic realm and could easily lead readers to think of the 
competition I describe in economic terms. In my application, the competition is social, 
not economic (even if in some cases it may have economic consequences). 
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only one will therefore have the opportunity to move into the 
advantaged position.  
The principal benefits accruing to the advantaged 
actors—the actors who can see and are free to occupy 
structural holes—are access to information and the ability to 
control others. The actor who best understands how to exploit 
the informational and control advantages of the structural 
holes (and indeed knows best how to recognize and occupy 
those structural holes) is the actor who will emerge as the most 
successful: he is a network entrepreneur. These opportunities 
are resources existing in every social network and organization 
and they are waiting to be exploited. Those who can identify 
and fill the structural holes will do better—whatever the 
rewards of the network—than those who lack this ability.  
I should note that Burt presents his theory as a positive 
one; that is, a theory of enhancing value that explains how 
competitors can improve their positions and attain the 
advantages that go with this improvement. But there is a dark 
side to structural hole theory as well.35 Though it is a theory of 
value, it can also be seen as a theory of manipulation, 
opportunism, and inefficiency. This article will focus on these 
aspects of the theory in the context of corporate governance. 
This very brief introduction to structural hole theory 
demonstrates why it is such a powerful analytical tool. 
Corporate governance scholarship has traditionally centered on 
what has come to be known as the “agency problem.”36 The 
question the agency problem presents is how to restrain 
corporate managers from shirking responsibility or stealing 
corporate assets. In the bulk of corporate scholarship over the 
last thirty years, the problem has taken the form of finding 
ways to reduce agency costs, i.e., the costs that arise from 
monitoring and preventing shirking and stealing (deadweight 
economic losses) or, to put it differently, of finding the most 
efficient ways to restrain shirking and stealing. While agency 
cost theory has made substantial contributions to our 
  
 35 See Carlo Morselli, Structuring Mr. Nice: Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
and Brokerage Positioning in the Cannabis Trade, 35 CRIME, LAW & SOC. CHANGE 203 
(2001); Robert Tillman & Michael Indergaard, Field of Schemes: Health Insurance 
Fraud in the Small Business Sector, 46 SOC. PROBS. 572 (1999). 
 36 Despite the predominance of neoclassical economic analysis since that 
time, as I noted earlier, the focus has existed at least since the time of Berle and 
Means. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1933). See also Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931). 
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understanding of corporate governance, its flaw is that it takes 
the traditional analytical approach of the subject as a given—it 
begins with the received structure of corporate law and treats 
the internal workings of the corporation largely as a black box.37 
Of course this is a flaw in the traditional approach itself.38 
Structural hole theory refocuses our inquiry by taking 
us into the box. Its power derives from several aspects of the 
sociological approach in which it originates. First, because the 
theory focuses on structure, it need not resort to the simplified 
assumption used by agency cost and transaction cost theorists 
that corporate actors seek only to maximize their wealth.39 
While this assumption does have utility in economic modeling, 
it places the corporate reformer in a difficult position. If we 
start with greed as an immutable motivation for behavior in 
the corporate context,40 our goal of reforming corporate law is 
hamstrung by the fact that we need to devise tools to restrain 
corporate actors’ pursuit of their own wealth even to the point 
of transgressing corporate norms. But history has 
demonstrated that restraining greed is an enormously difficult 
task. Even the attempts to align managerial and stockholder 
interests by encouraging executive compensation in the form of 
stock options has encouraged greed, which has led to 
substantial abuse, and is thus a partial cause of much 
corporate misbehavior.41  
  
 37 This is actually not true of the work of Fama and Jensen themselves, who 
build the corporate structure as evolving to provide the most efficient solutions to the 
agency problem. Fama & Jensen, supra note 11. See also Eugene Fama, Agency 
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980). Bainbridge also 
provides and exception, looking within corporate hierarchies to evaluate the quality of 
information flows throughout the corporation. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory 
Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657 (1996). 
 38 See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist 
Society, 24 J. CORP. L. 869 (1999) (arguing for the need for corporate governance 
scholars to expand their study into the internal workings of the corporation itself). 
 39 Williamson extends the self-interest model to opportunism. See 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 28, at 26-30. 
 40 I recognize that the pursuit of maximum self-interest assumed by 
neoclassicists can extend beyond monetary greed and apply to other preferences as 
well. In the corporate context, however, it is almost invariably assumed that the issue 
is money. Thus the reference to greed seems perfectly appropriate and accurate. 
 41 See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S 
NEWEST EXPORT (2001); Bebchuk et al., supra note 5; Murphy, supra note 14. For an 
excellent example of the relationship between managerial opportunism and corporate 
bureaucracy (which nonetheless focuses more on inefficient information production 
rather than structure per se), see Walter Novaes & Luigi Zingales, Bureaucracy as a 
Mechanism to Generate Information, CENTRE FOR ECON. POL’Y RES., June 2003, which 
argues that the information (managerial performance) creating potential of 
bureaucracies, coupled with managerial incentives to extract undue rent from the 
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A focus on structure as creating the conditions for 
opportunistic behavior allows us not only to consider broader 
motivations, but also enables us to see the way in which 
structural freedoms and constraints, in contrast to monitoring 
and mistrust, can alleviate problems that are the concern of 
agency theorists and other corporate scholars. In other words, 
rather than focusing on the restraint of greed, structural hole 
theory identifies places in the corporate structure that provide 
room for opportunistic behavior and allows us to concentrate on 
eliminating these opportunities for corporate actors to behave 
in self-serving ways. For the same reason, it enhances 
transaction cost analysis (which begins with the same 
motivational assumptions) by allowing us to begin with given 
structures rather than individually modeled behavior that 
leads to institutional structures. In this way, it reveals the 
power of position within structures, and enables us to see ways 
of restructuring hierarchies to reduce the circumstances in 
which opportunistic behavior can flourish.42 In addition to these 
benefits, structural hole theory is well conceived for rigorous 
empirical testing, as Burt demonstrates. Instead of relying 
upon reductionist accounts of motivation or attitudinal or 
psychological self-reporting, all structural hole theory requires 
is that survey subjects disclose those people with whom they 
have contacts, as well as the regularity and intensity of those 
contacts. These results can be verified by independently 
obtaining the same information from those with whom the 
subject claims to be in contact. Thus the structure emerges as 
empirical fact, with relatively little room for distortion. 
As a normative matter, structural hole theory can also 
show how a corporation can both eliminate structural 
blockages and enhance the efficiency of information flows. It 
does this by ensuring the proliferation of structural holes 
within its networks. As I noted earlier, Burt describes this 
  
corporation, lead boards to choose a bureaucratic structure that produces more 
information about executive performance instead of what perhaps might be a more 
optimal structure for the maximization of profits. Id. 
 42 This structural approach bridges the micro approach of transaction cost 
economics with the macro approach of network theory. BURT, supra note 27, at 181. 
The search for ways to bridge micro and macro models has been a significant project for 
sociologists. The bridge provided by network theory is its recognition that structure 
provides the resources and individuals attempt to benefit from the resources structure 
provides. This is especially noted by social capital theorists. Kenneth A. Frank & 
Jeffrey Y. Yasumoto, Linking Action to Social Structure Within a System: Social 
Capital Within and Between Subgroups, 104 AM. J. SOC. 642, 645 (1998). 
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positively, in an efficiency-enhancing way.43 Efficiency comes 
from the placement of trustworthy and loyal actors in positions 
where they can bridge structural holes, facilitating the transfer 
of information without the fear of manipulation. The theory can 
also be used positively for self-advancement, as a network 
entrepreneur sees the opportunity to fill a structural hole 
within the corporate bureaucracy. 
Finally, and most practically, the theory has the power 
to explain why simple governance reforms such as creating 
independent audit committees, nominating committees, and 
compensation committees, or composing boards principally of 
independent directors, may not be capable of resolving 
problems of inadequate monitoring. All of the board reforms 
currently underway will fail unless the structural opportunities 
for CEOs and other senior managers to control and manipulate 
information are reduced or eliminated. The failure of corporate 
law scholars to focus on the special role of the CEO and his 
subordinates has limited the set of possible solutions to 
corporate governance problems.44 The structural approach, 
however, presents new solutions.  
II. THE INTELLECTUAL PROVENANCE OF STRUCTURAL HOLE 
THEORY   
Structural hole theory is a theory of social capital. While 
social capital is a concept that recently has garnered scholarly 
  
 43 I will address the efficiency—or positive—aspect of structural holes infra 
note 72 and accompanying text. My purpose in this paper is to use the theory in a way 
that it has not been used, to examine the dark side of structural holes in the 
manipulation of information within the corporation. 
 44 The CEO may not always be the appropriate focus. Wayne Baker, studying 
a commercial real estate development firm that appears to have been a partnership, 
explicitly designed to maximize intrafirm networks, but with a designated CEO, 
concludes that the absence of the CEO would have little or no effect on firm 
performance. See Wayne E. Baker, The Network Organization in Theory and Practice, 
in NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE, FORM, AND ACTION 397 (Nitin Nohria 
& Robert G. Eccles, eds., 1992). The reason for his conclusion, however, appears to me 
to lie both in the partnership nature of the form and the conscious design of the firm to 
maximize networks (an approach to firm organization that he believes is highly 
unusual, since networks tend to develop spontaneously rather than consciously and 
wind up less complete and neat). Moreover, given the partnership nature of the firm, 
there does not appear to have been a board of directors, and so the essential structural 
hole I am exploring could not have existed. The likelihood of such a situation 
developing in a large public corporation, even one that is relatively flat in terms of 
structure, is not high, so the focus on the CEO in that context seems perfectly 
appropriate. See id. 
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and public attention,45 its definition is both elusive and debated. 
For purposes of this article, social capital, defined in its 
minimal formulation, is the set of resources available to a 
person, organization, or community that inheres in its social 
structure.46 Social structure includes the webs—or networks—of 
people and institutions that collectively constitute families, 
friendships, organizations, communities, and societies.47 
Although all treat social capital as a resource, the particular 
understanding of how the resource works and where it is found 
(in addition to whether it is more in the nature of a public good 
or more in the nature of an individual asset) differs among the 
various social capital theorists.  
One of the earliest approaches to social capital was the 
work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in the 1960s and 
1970s. Bourdieu began from a distinctly anthropological 
perspective, understanding culture as “a dynamic and creative, 
but also a structured phenomenon.”48 His theory established a 
triad of economic, cultural, and social capital, with economic 
capital the most dominant factor. 
James Coleman’s theory of social capital is a frank 
attempt to draw together economics and sociology, originating 
in his own theories of rational choice.49 Coleman asked how 
human capital, which is educational attainment and skills, 
affected the equality or inequality of persons in society. 
Coleman theorized that social capital consisted of two parts: 
first, the social structures themselves, and second, the way 
they affected the actions of given actors within the structure.50 
  
 45 Largely due, most likely, to Robert Putnam’s 2000 book on the subject. 
ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000). Bowling Alone follows upon Putnam’s earlier 
work on social capital in Italy, ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK (1993). 
 46 At this point the functional definition of social capital as a resource seems 
generally accepted. Frank & Yasumoto, supra note 42, at 645. The earliest use of the 
term, adopting a definition similar to the one in the text (but in a different context) 
appears to be by Glenn Loury. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 
300 (1990). See Glenn C. Loury, A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences, in 
WOMEN, MINORITIES, AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 153 (Phyllis A. Wallace, ed., 
1977); Glenn C. Loury & John David Skrentny, Passing Strict Scrutiny: Using Social 
Science to Design Affirmative Action Programs, 90 GEO. L.J. 835, 841 (2002). 
 47 Network theory itself has been recently popularized in DUNCAN E. WATTS, 
SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2003) (laying out a new way to 
understand the way networks grow, work, and how they drive collective behavior). 
 48 Tom Schuller et al., Social Capital: A Review and Critique, in SOCIAL 
CAPITAL: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 3 (Stephen Baron et al., eds., 2000). 
 49 See generally James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human 
Capital, 94 AM. J. SOC. 95 (1988) for an explication of his functionalist view of human 
capital at a late stage in his career. 
 50 COLEMAN, supra note 46, at 302. 
 4/11/2005 2:37:27 PM 
2005]     STRUCTURAL HOLES, CEOS, AND INFORMATIONAL MONOPOLIES 1331 
Coleman’s argument focused on the way in which powerful 
people remained powerful through their social networks with 
other powerful people. Coleman also saw social capital itself as 
a resource that could be manipulated through the creation of 
social relations with other actors, including trust, obligations of 
reciprocity, and specific social expectations. Given the common 
understanding of human capital as the educational attainment 
and skills of an actor, Coleman believed that social capital and 
human capital were interrelated.51 The principal flaw in 
Coleman’s work is the circularity of its conclusion—powerful 
people tend to remain powerful because they are powerful 
people, without a clear explanation of how they become 
powerful in the first place.52 
Robert Putnam, whose famous early work on social 
capital derived from his study of regional governments in Italy, 
noted a distinct difference in the performance of governments 
in the north and south, leading him to focus on the extent to 
which civic engagement made a difference in explaining the 
greater effectiveness of northern governments.53 The particular 
variables he examined were associational life, newspaper 
reading, voter turnout, and voter preferences. He expanded his 
examination of these variables in his book, Bowling Alone, in 
which he looked at the decline in associations from bowling 
leagues, coffee time with neighbors, sewing circles, and similar 
activities, concluding that the level of civic engagement in the 
United States had seriously declined. He hypothesized that 
this decline was largely due to a dramatic increase in television 
watching.54 The core of social capital, in Putnam’s definition, 
lies in three factors: social networks, social norms, and trust. 
Unlike Bourdieu and Coleman, who focused on the benefits of 
social capital to the individual actor, Putnam took a more 
global view. Thus, he treated social capital as a true public 
good, essential to the maintenance of civic society, as is 
foreshadowed by the title of his seminal work on Italy, Making 
Democracy Work.55 This, of course, is not surprising given 
Putnam’s training as a political scientist. In fact, the different 
  
 51 Schuller, supra note 46, at 6. 
 52 See COLEMAN, supra note 46. 
 53 See id. 
 54 It’s probably worth noting that criticism of Putnam’s empirical base and 
social capital categories has become something of a cottage industry. It may be that 
this has pushed him to a more instrumental view of social capital. 
 55 See COLEMAN, supra note 46 
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professional backgrounds of these three major theorists of 
social capital help to explain their understanding of the 
importance of the concept, as illustrated by Bourdieu’s interest 
in culture, Coleman’s in rational behavior, and Putnam’s in 
democratic governance.56  
Structural hole theory grows out of the confluence of 
social capital theory with economic sociology. Social capital 
theory and economic sociology—and thus a greater interest in 
how social structure contributes to private goods—developed 
along a somewhat parallel historical track. In the mid-1970s, 
Mark Granovetter, working with the sociological tool of 
network theory, which seeks to explain the ways in which 
particular social structures affect relations among people,57 
developed his seminal theory of “the strength of weak ties.”58 
The paradox, Granovetter explained, was that network 
theorists treated close relationships among people as the key 
variable affecting their behavior, relationships that he 
described as “strong ties.” But it was not these strong ties that 
were essentially important in the economic realm. 59 Rather, he 
found, most people surveyed found their jobs not through close 
friends and family but through more casual acquaintances, 
relationships he described as “weak ties.” The more weak ties a 
person had, the broader and more far-reaching was her social 
network, and thus the more likely it was that she could 
maximize her own opportunities by exploiting those ties in 
order to advance her career. Granovetter later retested this 
hypothesis with somewhat mixed results,60 but the theory itself 
has become one of the principal building blocks of economic 
sociology. It should be clear that weak ties are a form of social 
capital, a resource deriving from the social structure that 
actors can use to better their positions and which actors can 
  
 56 As Putnam’s work has developed, his focus has shifted from pure 
participation in associational life to the ways in which such participation develops 
norms of reciprocity that form the core of social obligation. In other words, Putnam 
seems to have moved from an understanding of social capital as more like public good 
to social capital as more like a private resource, albeit necessarily sustained by the 
social structure. 
 57 This is in contrast, for example, to the ways in which the structures of 
particular institutions might affect behavior. 
 58 Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 
(1973). 
 59 Granovetter’s particular interest at the time was how people found work. 
MARK S. GRANOVETTER, GETTING A JOB: A STUDY OF CONTACTS AND CAREERS (1974). 
 60 Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory 
Revisited, in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 201 (Randall Collins ed., 1983). 
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consciously seek to accumulate. As I will discuss, the theory of 
structural holes begins in part with Granovetter’s theory.  
Structural hole theory is a theory of social capital 
because as it develops it takes the two component words of the 
term quite literally. First, it is “social” in that the exploitive 
opportunities of an actor derive from the social networks in 
which he is embedded. Second, it is “capital” in that the actor’s 
particular placement in that network—in the position 
described as a structural hole—is, like weak ties, a resource 
that can be used to maximize other resources by allowing the 
actor to affect the terms of his own relationships with others.  
While structural hole theory is a theory of social capital, 
it is different from the work that I described earlier because of 
its relentless instrumentality.61 Moreover, unlike much 
sociological work, structural hole theory is not simply 
descriptive, but is also predictive: based on extensive empirical 
testing, Burt has identified the specific network structures and 
hierarchies that allow us to predict things like which managers 
in a given corporation will advance at the fastest rate. The 
ideal network structure for this purpose varies with the age, 
gender, and duration of a particular manager’s employment.62  
This predictive aspect of the theory can also help us 
determine the best structures of governance for public 
corporations by allowing us to see how given social structures 
are defective. That is, structure reveals informational and 
control opportunities which network (in our case, corporate) 
actors could use either to the advantage or disadvantage of the 
corporation while serving themselves. The theory further 
provides insight into how we might alter structures to prevent 
the proliferation of these locii of self-interest or, to the extent 
they are desirable, increase them. It is for this reason that 
structural hole theory holds great promise as a tool for focusing 
  
 61 This isn’t terribly surprising since Burt studied with Coleman. Richard 
Swedberg, Major Traditions of Economic Sociology, 17 ANN. REV. SOC. 251, 269 (1991). 
Swedberg’s own theories, based on theories of rational choice, were themselves 
instrumental. Burt’s work, while serious and scholarly, sometimes reads like a 
sociological version of How to Succeed in Business Without Really Trying. 
 62 Burt’s empirical data were derived from his study of “one of America’s 
largest high-technology firms.” BURT, supra note 27, at 118. He later used what 
appears from his description to be the same firm in his refinement of the theory 
although he reports data from other studies in this article. Ronald S. Burt, The 
Contingent Value of Social Capital, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 339 (1997). He based his study of 
market competition and structural holes on seventy-seven product markets as 
classified by the U.S. Department of Commerce. BURT, supra note 27, at 85. 
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the debates over the most effective methods of corporate 
governance. 
Burt’s theory of structural holes developed from the 
groundwork of Granovetter’s theory of weak ties.63 Recall that 
Granovetter saw the weakness of social ties as a correlate of 
information flows that enables actors with weak ties to have 
access to information that they otherwise would not. Burt’s 
departure from Granovetter’s theory rests on two aspects of 
that theory. First is the issue of causation. What is causative of 
the effectiveness of weak ties, he argues, is not the strength or 
weakness of the particular ties themselves, but of the 
structural holes they span64 (or the opportunity presented by 
the structural hole for an entrepreneur to place himself in the 
middle of potential information flows among networks). The 
second is that Burt finds that the strength or weakness of the 
ties does not matter—information flows over both. The relevant 
question for Burt is whether or not those ties are redundant 
(which, as I will later explain, means whether they efficiently 
and effectively reach the same people or whether they reach 
new networks).  
Burt criticizes Granovetter’s theory by arguing that “the 
weak tie argument obscures the control benefits of structural 
holes.”65 The theory of weak ties is about bridges—about the 
paths along which information flows. The structural hole 
argument is about “chasms”—the interruptions of those flows.66 
The person who can see the chasm and bridge it is in a position 
not only to receive information, but to control the information 
flows himself, regardless of whether the tie is weak or strong. 
III. WHAT IS A “STRUCTURAL HOLE”? 
With this brief introduction to the development and 
basic insight of structural hole theory, it is time now to explain 
  
 63 BURT, supra note 27, at 26-28. 
 64 Id. at 26-27. 
 65 Id. at 28. Burt is not always clear about whether structural holes are 
spaces in the social structure or intersections of networks that occur within 
individuals. My best reading is that he means they are both. Compare id. at 190, 192 
(describing structural holes as relations that intersect). I don’t believe that the 
ambiguity is at all important. Structural holes, it appears, can be both gaps unfilled 
between or among networks, or the gap once filled. The important point is that the 
possibility of filling the gap creates the competitive opportunities that are the essence 
of structural holes. 
 66 Id. at 28. 
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some of the technical aspects of the theory.67 A structural hole 
is a bridge between nonredundant contacts.68 Nonredundancy is 
characterized by the presence of two criteria: lack of cohesion 
and lack of structural equivalence. Cohesion refers to the 
strength of the relationship in question. Strong relationships 
signal that no structural hole exists. Burt provides examples of 
cohesive ties as between father and son or husband and wife. If 
either one of the actors in that relationship is a strong contact 
of yours, you effectively have access to the other person. Think 
of a group of close friends who live in the same neighborhood, 
travel together, and meet socially on a regular basis. A strong 
tie with one of these friends, in effect, gives you access to the 
information possessed by the entire network.69 Leaving aside 
information that is understood by the group to remain 
confidential within it, contact with one is contact with all.70 
There is no gap in the network for you to occupy. As a result, 
you derive no informational benefits (although you might 
derive social pleasure) from establishing ties to other members 
of the group. The relationship is characterized by cohesion and 
is therefore redundant. Figure Two illustrates this idea.  
 
  
 67 The theory itself is rather complex, although it depends upon one central, 
fairly simple, insight. The complexity of the theory lies more in its various implications 
than in the concept itself. I have thus drawn on the centrally important aspects of the 
theory as being those that are relevant to an initial explication of the problems of 
corporate governance in an attempt to avoid complicating the story and confusing the 
reader with details that, at this point, are only of subsidiary importance. 
 68 BURT, supra note 27, at 17-18. 
 69 Limited, although Burt disregards this, by norms of confidentiality and 
perhaps somewhat tempered by in-group psychology. For a recent application of in-
group psychological theory see generally O’Connor, supra note 12. One of the gaps in 
Burt’s work, as I read it, is his failure to account for the role of group norms in 
regulating behavior within networks. However, this appears to be quite intentional and 
characteristic of the structural approach taken by Burt, because it also provides one of 
the virtues of the structural approach, in its relentless empiricism based on observable 
facts (which norms, beliefs, and values are not). Sociologists working in the general 
area of structural equivalence (of which structural hole theory is an example) have 
been criticized for failing to account for actors’ “beliefs, values, and normative 
commitments.” Mustafa Emirbayer & Jeff Goodwin, Network Analysis, Culture, and 
the Problem of Agency, 99 AM. J. SOC. 1411, 1425 (1994). See generally Frank & 
Yasumoto, supra note 42, for a more norms based social capital approach to 
competition and cooperation within competitive networks. 
 70 The likelihood of information moving from one member of the group to 
another is a direct function of the strength of their ties. BURT, supra note 27, at 18-19. 
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Figure 2:  Cohesion 
 
Structural equivalence refers to people who have the 
same contacts. Take the group of friends mentioned earlier. Let 
us assume you have contacts with Ivan and Alyosha. If Ivan 
and Alyosha each have contacts with Fyodor and Dmitri, Ivan 
and Alyosha are structurally equivalent—your connections 
with Fyodor and Dmitri are indirect, but redundant through 
Ivan and Alyosha. You can magnify the structural equivalence 
even further if Fyodor and Dmitri each have contacts with 
Adelaida and Sofya. Your contacts with Ivan and Alyosha do 
nothing to increase your network advantages. Each provides 
you with exactly the same network benefits as your own tie to 
the other. Figure Three is an illustration of this point.  
 
Figure 3:   Structural Equivalence 
 
Once we have determined that your contacts are neither 
cohesive nor redundant, we turn to the question of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the network ties provided by 
your contacts. An efficient network is one in which you 
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maximize your nonredundant ties in a particular network (that 
is, ties that lack coherence and structural equivalence). It does 
you no good to maintain contact with members of the same 
network, since this produces precisely the redundancy you are 
trying to avoid. Maximizing your nonredundant ties maximizes 
the number of structural holes you get for each contact. In 
other words, you can maintain contact with the same number 
of people (that is, the network), at significantly lower cost by 
focusing your energies on only one primary contact in the 
network.71 As is implied by the concept of economic efficiency 
upon which Burt draws, such an approach allows you to 
maintain your contacts at the lowest possible cost.  
For example, assume that you know Ivan and Alyosha, 
who also know each other. You also know Fyodor and Dmitri, 
who know each other but neither of whom know Ivan or 
Alyosha. You are wasting your time maintaining all four 
contacts. You’re far better off forgetting about Alyosha and 
Dmitri. Your contact with Ivan gives you access to information 
from Alyosha, and your contact with Fyodor gives you access to 
information from Dmitri. By transferring your energies from 
all four contacts only to Ivan and Fyodor, you have increased 
the efficiency of your networks by maintaining four contacts for 
the cost of two. The time saved by dropping your contact with 
Alyosha and Dmitri can be used to expand your network by 
making other contacts. Figures Four and Five illustrate an 
inefficient and efficient network. 
Figure 4:   Network Inefficiency 
 
  
 71 There is an additional element necessary to create the efficient network as 
Burt discusses, and that is to select the right person in each network with whom to 
make contact. This largely turns on the question of who you think you can most trust 
in the network to provide you with timely and accurate information. Burt also notes 
that network efficiencies imply that you should choose as your contact not only the 
most trustworthy member of the group but the one with whom contact is easiest to 
maintain and who is most likely to reciprocate personal favors. Id. at 20-21. 
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Figure 5:  Network Efficiency 
 
This concept of nonredundancy explains why the 
existence of structural holes might increase corporate 
efficiency. The greater the extent to which managers are 
connected only to primary contacts in a network, the less time 
they waste by spending it with people who will provide 
redundant information. In order to see this, simply take the 
preceding example and imagine that Ivan and Alyosha, and 
Fyodor and Dmitri, respectively work in different divisions of 
the corporation. By dropping Alyosha and Dmitri, you get the 
same informational benefits with less work. To the extent that 
bureaucracies are information-producing organizations, using 
structure to achieve this result is a relatively low-cost way of 
improving the efficiency of this informational function. There 
is, however, a tradeoff for this increased efficiency, as I will 
later demonstrate. The corporation that undertakes to create 
structural holes may do so at its peril.  
Network effectiveness is about increasing the total size of 
your network. The concept mandates that you deploy your 
resources efficiently by maintaining your primary contact, thus 
enabling you to use the remainder of your resources to 
establish and maintain primary contacts in different networks. 
Doing so, you will maximize the total size of your network by 
connecting to people who themselves have connections to other 
networks. In effect, you ideally choose one primary contact, and 
you leave to this person the job of developing and maintaining 
the cluster of contacts that form his network.72 In a sense, you 
  
 72 Burt is not entirely clear as to whether you should choose primary contacts 
who have the largest networks or choose primary contacts and maintain them while 
they build their networks by including more people (which increases your number of 
secondary contacts, and thus total contacts). The ambiguity arises from his assertion in 
the text that the primary contact maintains the network. Id. at 21. His diagram shows 
you maintaining the same number of primary contacts, but with their networks 
growing, which he also describes as the goal of network effectiveness. Id. at 20-23. I 
believe the second reading is more consistent with his theory and it is the reading I 
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are using your primary contact to diversify your network 
portfolio, while at the same time she increases it. Because you 
are the bridge among various networks, you receive 
information from one network that might be desirable to 
members of other networks. You are thus in a position to use 
that information as you see fit, or to use it (as we will later see) 
to manipulate the various networks to which you are 
connected. Network effectiveness contrasts with network 
efficiency. Network efficiency diminishes the cost of 
maintaining networks for each contact. Network effectiveness 
increases the overall size of your network. 
Choosing effective contacts means choosing contacts in 
each network who are the most likely to make contacts with 
others. If they are not, they are probably not good choices for 
helping you to establish an effective network. Similarly, you 
should choose the contact in each network who is likely to be 
the most trustworthy and loyal to you. It is this combination of 
ability to build their own networks, trust, and loyalty in your 
primary contacts that enables you to build an effective 
network. As an example, assume that you know Ivan and 
Alyosha, neither of whom knows the other. Ivan and Alyosha 
become acquainted with Fyodor and Dmitri, respectively. 
Fyodor and Dmitri respectively become acquainted with 
Adelaida and Sofya. And Adelaida and Sofya become 
acquainted, respectively, with Pyotr and Vorokhov. Simply by 
maintaining your primary contact with Ivan and Alyosha, your 
network has expanded from two contacts to eight contacts. 
Assuming they are trustworthy and loyal, Ivan and Alyosha 
are effective primary contacts. This is an effective network. 
While Ivan and Alyosha grow and maintain their networks, 
you are free to seek out other primary contacts. Now assume 
that you meet Ahab. From your conversation with him, you 
learn that the only other contact he has is Moby and, given 
your assessment of his personality, you don’t believe he is 
likely to expand his network beyond Moby. This is reason 
enough for you not to establish primary contact with him (not 
to mention your suspicions about his trustworthiness and 
loyalty). You are far better off using your energy to make a 
more promising additional primary contact. Figure Six 
illustrates network effectiveness.  
 
  
present in the text. 
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Figure 6: 
 
There are several situations in which network efficiency 
is not optimal. One, specifically mentioned by Burt, is a dense 
cluster of resources, like a board of directors and a CEO. The 
other is friendship networks because, in Burt’s felicitous 
phrasing, “Judging friends on the basis of efficiency is an 
interpersonal flatulence from which friends will flee.”73 As he 
says with respect to networks like the board: 
These clusters are so important to the vitality of the rest of the 
network that it is worth treating each person in them as a primary 
contact, regardless of redundancy. Saturation [the phrase he uses to 
describe such networks] minimizes the risk of losing effective contact 
with the cluster and minimizes the risk of missing an important 
opportunity anywhere in the cluster.74  
As I will later discuss, while treating the board as a 
saturated cluster (a single network in which the actor has ties 
to each member) may be important to the CEO’s success, it has 
more nefarious implications as well. 
Thus far we have principally focused on the 
informational benefits of structural holes. There is, however, a 
second benefit of structural hole theory—control.75 Effectively 
  
 73 Id. at 24-25. 
 74 Id. at 25. 
 75 As with the efficiency-increasing properties of structural holes for 
information flows within organizations, the control benefits of structural holes may 
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exploiting a structural hole allows you to manipulate various 
networks to which you are connected (or individual people who 
are nonredundant contacts) by playing them off against one 
another in two different ways. The first way is exemplified by a 
simple economic transaction. Assume that you want to sell 
your house and you have two bidders. Clearly you can increase 
the price you will receive if you encourage them to bid against 
one another.76 Fostering this type of bidding war ties the control 
advantage of structural holes to the informational advantage 
previously discussed.  
The second kind of control benefit occurs when one is 
situated between two players who have conflicting desires. This 
can occur, for example, when an associate in a law firm is 
working on major deals with two different partners, both of 
which heat up simultaneously, leaving each partner to compete 
for the associate’s time. The associate is in a position to play 
one off the other to his advantage. Robert Merton describes an 
actor in the associate’s position as “a more or less influential 
bystander”77 whose function is to make the partners’ conflicting 
demands their problem rather than the associate’s problem. 
(This is similar to the role of a child in a two parent family). 
Both strategies have implications for the structure of corporate 
governance. 
All of this sounds terribly manipulative, and one might 
reasonably ask again what using structural hole theory to 
analyze corporate governance adds to the already rich tool box 
of neoclassical and behavioral economics. After all, these 
approaches assume manipulative or opportunistic actors. And 
the theory resembles one that describes ways in which actors 
can maximize their wealth by becoming social capital 
entrepreneurs. 
  
also increase efficiency depending upon the way they are exploited by the actor who 
identifies them. 
 76 All the better if neither knows the other’s bid—this often can get you a 
higher price than you would otherwise receive because their lack of information may 
lead one to bid more than is necessary to beat the other. Real estate brokers in hot 
markets have caught on to this idea by including escalation clauses in their clients’ 
contracts which set up an auction among multiple bidders. Such contracts specify 
incremental increases in bidding price a potential buyer is willing to offer in a contest 
to obtain a house and is usually capped at some amount. Such clauses have become de 
rigueur in parts of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. 
 77 ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 431 (1968). 
The technical term for such a person is a tertius gaudens from an Italian proverb 
meaning “one who benefits.” I avoid the use of the term in the text to avoid introducing 
jargon unnecessary to the paper. 
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But the theory does add significantly to these other 
methodologies. First, it eliminates the neoclassical 
presumption that actors are autonomous and that the dyadic 
transaction is the appropriate focus of inquiry. Actors are not 
autonomous—they are embedded in social networks, and for all 
of its occasional reversion to neoclassicism, structural hole 
theory advances considerably beyond asocial neoclassical 
approaches by explaining the ways in which networks are 
themselves the sources of competition. Gaps in the network 
facilitate competition by creating opportunities to obtain 
positional advantages.  
In addition, structural hole theory provides a powerful 
alternative to neoclassical analysis by eliding the need to 
identify wealth (or anything else for that matter) as a 
maximand.78 People behave entrepreneurially for a variety of 
reasons: for instance, the simple psychological desire to 
succeed, the fun of the game, and the maximization of wealth, 
among others. Burt believes that clarifying opportunities is 
motivation enough in and of itself. That is to say, given two 
opportunities an actor will take the clearer path.79 Thus, Burt 
treats motive and opportunity as equivalents.80 This may 
appear to be a cop-out; after all, the manipulative behavior 
observed and, to some extent, prescribed by, structural hole 
theory is unpleasant to many of us.81 Moreover, the 
opportunities described are frequently, if coincidentally, wealth 
maximizing opportunities.82 
  
 78 In this respect it also advances beyond transaction cost economics which 
remains mired in neoclassical assumptions about motivations and goals. 
 79 BURT, supra note 27, at 35. 
 80 Id. at 35-36. 
 81 Burt effectively admits that this stance is a cop-out. “I am begging the 
question of how opportunity and motivation are connected. I emphasize the causal 
priority of opportunity. The opposite emphasis is traditional in sociology. . . . Here I 
emphasize opportunity because I can analyze it in a rigorous way with network 
concepts and describe a great variety of empirical events.” Id. at 275 n.13. His 
dispensation with concerns of motivation (although they do appear in Chapter Seven) 
isn’t especially troubling for my purposes because the point of this project is to develop 
a purely structural analysis that can identify particular points of weakness or strength 
within the corporate structure.  
  Others, however, believe that structural instrumentalists like Burt 
actually rely upon utility maximization. See Emirbayer & Goodwin, supra note 69, at 
1428. 
 82 Some of this may derive from Burt’s use of American institutions as his 
empirical base. This practice embeds his theory in a society which, at least in the 
economic realm, has come to embody many of the characteristics described by the 
neoclassical model. See Nicole Woolsey Biggart & Gary G. Hamilton, On the Limits of a 
Firm-Based Theory to Explain Business Networks: The Western Bias of Neoclassical 
 
 4/11/2005 2:37:27 PM 
2005]     STRUCTURAL HOLES, CEOS, AND INFORMATIONAL MONOPOLIES 1343 
For purposes of this article and its focus on the CEO 
(who has already demonstrated network entrepreneurship by 
climbing the corporate ladder), it may be enough to leave the 
question of motivation open, since control is central to 
structural hole theory and control is, after all, the job and goal 
of the CEO.83 But for those who demand a maximand in order to 
appreciate a theory, perhaps we can make do for purposes of 
this discussion with maximization of control as the behavioral 
motivation. For the broader uses of structural hole theory 
(perhaps even broader uses within the context of analyzing 
corporate behavior at lower levels, or at the board level), it is 
enough to say that—at least in its descriptive and, in my 
adaptation of it, diagnostic aspects—structural hole theory 
needs no particular motivational assumption in order to enable 
us to examine organizational structure. Thus, our goal is to 
identify, as points of weakness, holes that can be occupied by 
actors who are then able to manipulate corporate behavior or to 
control information flows in ways that may be disadvantageous 
to the corporation. Whether or not corporate actors take 
advantage of the opportunities provided by structural holes, 
the important observation is the manner in which structure 
creates these opportunities. In this way, structural holes can be 
seen as a source of freedom obtained by opening up networks, 
where desirable, to either permit a freer flow of information or 
to destroy the possibility of control monopolies. Whatever the 
motivation of particular actors might be, the opportunities that 
are created by network structure can be used for good or ill (or 
not used at all). Knowing where they are and their potential 
  
Economics, in NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 44, at 471, 488. See also 
GRANOVETTER, supra note 59, at 447 (noting that rational or instrumental behavior 
aims not only at economic goals but also “at sociability, approval, status, and power”). 
On the other hand, the structural equivalence approach to sociology of which Burt’s 
work is an example has been criticized for conceptualizing actors in “narrowly utility-
maximizing and instrumental ways.” Emirbayer & Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1425. I 
do not find this especially troubling, despite my personal distaste for neoclassical 
analysis, because these motivations, while perhaps implicit (especially in economic 
sociological work) are not necessary aspects of the theory which itself relies solely upon 
structure. So while narrow instrumentalism might be implicit in a structuralist 
account, it is tangential and irrelevant to the explanatory power of the theory. For a 
motivational account analyzing the interrelationship between structure and 
psychological motivation, see James N. Baron & Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Social Psychology 
of Organizations and Inequality, 57 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 190 (1994). 
 83 Harrison C. White, Agency as Control in Formal Networks, in NETWORKS 
AND ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 44, at 92. (“To manage is to make use of ties. To gain 
and maintain control requires attending to networks of ties.”) The classic work on the 
subject of the role of the CEO is CHESTER BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 
(1938). 
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effects allows us greater insight into appropriate organizational 
design.  
IV. THE APPLICATION OF STRUCTURAL HOLE THEORY TO 
PROBLEMS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporations are webs of social networks. The power of 
an actor in a social network depends more on his connections 
between networks than on his position within a given network. 
Simply put, the corporate actor with the most nonredundant 
network contacts (who has bridged the greatest number of 
structural holes) is better positioned to monopolize information, 
engender competition between networks or other actors (i.e., 
the house auction), and control the behavior of other actors 
(i.e., the university president and the law firm associate), 
which may translate into the ability to determine his own 
power and profit. These opportunities are available to him 
because, by taking advantage of structural holes, he effectively 
becomes the sole vector of a variety of separate networks,84 a 
position that gives him substantial autonomy in managing 
intracorporate relations and, as a consequence, his own 
position in the corporation.85 
The basic aspects of structural hole theory and their 
applicability to the problem of corporate boards should now be 
clear. Prior to the 1980s, most public corporation boards were 
comprised of a majority of non-independent directors.86 The 
tradition of inside directors (or at least directors with 
substantial ties to the corporation and corporate management 
below the level of CEO87) began in the early stages of 
bureaucratic corporate growth and persisted into the 1980s. 
These directors were, generally, high level executives of the 
corporation or so-called “gray” directors: the corporation’s 
bankers or lawyers who regularly worked with upper 
management.88 Whatever the problems of these inside directors, 
  
 84 This is a bit of an oversimplification, but suffices for purposes of discussion. 
For a more complex depiction, see BURT, supra note 27, at 22 fig. 1.4, which illustrates 
the process of optimizing your structural holes. 
 85  See id. at 45-49; Burt, supra note 62. See also Mark S. Granovetter, The 
Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 (1973) 
 86 Bhagat & Black, supra note 15, at 238. 
 87 These are commonly referred to as “affiliated directors” and are typically 
professionals like lawyers and investment bankers, whose day to day work with the 
corporation typically involves substantial and sustained contact with executives other 
than the CEO.  
 88 Gray directors are typically classified as a form of outside director. I depart 
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real or perceived, the very nature of their relationships with 
the corporation ensured that they had ties to corporate 
managers below the level of CEO. Put in terms of network 
theory, they had ties to networks that were independent of the 
CEO. Thus the number of nonredundant corporate contacts 
they had, and therefore their access to corporate information, 
was not dependent solely upon the CEO. These ties to networks 
below the CEO gave them independent access to corporate 
information, putting them in a position to verify information 
provided by the CEO (whether or not they actually took 
advantage of it by challenging the CEO). 
Beginning in the 1980s, the number of inside directors 
on corporate boards began to diminish as corporate boards 
moved toward independence. This shift was spurred, in part, by 
two developments.89 First, the American Law Institute adopted 
its Principles of Corporate Governance, which initially 
advocated independent directors (directors without personal or 
financial ties to the corporation) in a variety of contexts. 
Although the ALI took a more moderate position in its final 
draft,90 the Principles do envision a “monitoring” board with a 
substantial number of independent directors, a concept which 
itself implies substantial directorial independence. Second, the 
Delaware Supreme Court, in fighting its way through a whirl 
of takeovers, tried to develop doctrine appropriate to evaluate 
boards’ fulfillment of their fiduciary obligations. The Court 
noted repeatedly that boards dominated by independent 
directors were likely to receive more deference than boards 
with a substantial number of inside directors.91 As finance came 
  
from this usage because, with respect to the problem I’m discussing, they are situated 
more like inside directors than independent directors who are true outside directors. 
 89 Westphal and Zajac have noted the substantial increase in boards 
dominated by outside directors. James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Defections from 
the Inner Circle: Social Exchange, Reciprocity, and the Diffusion of Board Independence 
in U.S. Corporations, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 161 (1997). 
 90 The moderation largely was a result of political pressure from large firm 
lawyers protecting their perception of their clients’ interests.  
 91 See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 
1154 (Del. 1989); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 
1988); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corporation, 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del. 
1987); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 n.3 (Del. 
1986); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985). There may also 
be a sociological dimension to the proliferation of outside boards. Gerald Davis and 
Henrich Greve, examining the spread of golden parachutes and poison pills among 
corporations, look to network theory to explain how the adoption of these devices may 
well be attributable to information flows through interlocking directorates. Gerald F. 
Davis & Henrich R. Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 
1980s, 103 AM. J. SOC. 1 (1997). The same mechanism might at least in part have been 
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to dominate management and the intercorporate transaction 
became an important tool of continued corporate development, 
the need for corporations to be free of fiduciary taint increased. 
Boards became increasingly independent.92 Finally, the 
corporate scandals of 2002 led not only to the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, with its emphasis on directorial 
independence, but also to New York Stock Exchange reforms 
requiring listed corporations to have a majority of independent 
directors. Other business associations joined in advocating 
largely independent boards as well.93 With directorial 
independence, and the absence of corporate insiders other than 
the CEO and perhaps one other executive on the corporate 
board, directors began to lose their network ties into the 
corporate structure. Ties with managers and other corporate 
insiders were eliminated, and replaced by a single tie into the 
network, the CEO.94 As a result, directors became more 
dependent on the CEO for their information. Directors were not 
left completely isolated. Executives themselves belong to 
networks of other executives that tend to produce institutional 
conformity among corporations.95 The relatively small number 
of directors of large American corporations compared to the 
total number of corporations suggests some degree of director 
overlap. In addition, a substantial subset of directors are CEOs 
of their own corporations, which provides them with significant 
network ties outside of the particular corporations they serve. 
While this may produce a level of conformity among directors, 
it does not itself suggest that the majority of independent 
directors have network ties within a given corporation beyond 
the CEO and any other insider who happens to sit on the 
board. 
  
responsible for the spread of outside boards. 
 92 See the survey data in Bhagat & Black, supra note 15, at 239.  
 93 Other organizations, like the Business Roundtable, have jumped on the 
bandwagon. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1997). 
The Business Roundtable is composed of leading CEOs. Their support for independent 
boards should not be surprising once one understands that this is entirely in their self-
interest. 
 94 But see James D. Westphal, Collaboration in the Boardroom: Behavioral 
and Performance Consequences of CEO-Board Social Ties, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 7, 16 
(1999) (finding empirical evidence that corporations with CEO social ties to board 
members improve collaboration and advice seeking and that such corporations show 
improved performance). 
 95 See Glenn R. Carroll & Albert C. Teo, On the Social Networks of Managers, 
39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 421 (1996); Marta A. Geletkanycz & Donald C. Hambrick, The 
External Ties of Top Executives: Implications for Strategic Choice and Performance, 42 
ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 654 (1997). 
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These observations, in light of the insights provided by 
structural hole theory, suggest two hypotheses: 
1. Corporations that have inside boards96 will have a 
weak CEO; and 
2. Corporations that have independent boards will have 
a strong CEO. 
These hypotheses are counterintuitive and contrary to 
most of the accepted wisdom of corporate scholarship.97 It has 
long been an article of faith, as well as accepted by corporate 
scholarship98 and in caselaw,99 that corporations with inside 
boards have the strongest CEOs.100 Insiders, dependent for their 
jobs on the good will of the CEO, are unlikely to oppose him. 
This argument is fundamentally flawed. It assumes that the 
work of the board actually takes place at the board level. As a 
number of studies have demonstrated,101 this simply is not true. 
To the extent that board members seek to challenge CEOs, 
they tend to do so in discussions outside of the board meeting. 
And, if confrontation with the CEO is to occur, it does so either 
informally or is choreographed in advance by the dissidents. 
While I lack evidence to substantiate this point, it follows 
logically that challenges to the CEO would be posed by 
independent directors, if at all. But the clear implication of 
network theory is that the independent directors will have 
received the information to challenge the CEO from their 
relationships, established on the board, with inside directors 
whose networks extend deep into the corporate hierarchy. By 
virtue of these relationships, the independent directors have 
sources of information independent of the CEO. They need not 
rely upon the kind or quality of the information the CEO 
  
 96 By “inside board” I do not mean to suggest that the board is exclusively or, 
even necessarily mostly, composed of insiders, only that a significant number of 
insiders other than the CEO sit on the board. 
 97 But see note 14 and accompanying text, for recent questioning of the 
desirability of independent boards and attention to CEO power in relation to the board. 
Although none of these studies provides a direct connection between independent 
boards and CEO power (although Westphal, supra note 19, comes close), they clearly 
intuit the problem. The hypotheses not only clearly identify the problem but provide an 
explanation for these intuitions. 
 98 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 99 See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT & DAVID F. CRAVERS, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE 
ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (West 2004) (2003). 
 100 But see the work done on the relationship between independent boards and 
executive compensation cited supra note 14. 
 101 The classic, if dated, studies are JAY LORSCH & EVELYN MACIVER, PAWNS 
OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS (1989) and MYLES L. 
MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971). 
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presents. Given this greater access, the directors on an inside 
board, whether inside or independent, will be in a better 
position to challenge the CEO (even if the challenge is fronted 
by the independent directors to shield the inside directors from 
termination or retaliation for perceived disloyalty to the CEO). 
Hypothesis one is illustrated by Figure Seven.  
 
Figure 7:  Corporations that have inside boards will have 
weak CEOs 
 
 
Hypothesis two suggests that in a corporation with an 
independent board, the CEO will be strong. The reason should 
by now be obvious. Unlike the corporation with an inside board, 
containing members with substantial network ties into the 
corporate hierarchy—the corporation with an independent 
board has only one structural hole between the subordinate 
managers and the board. In other words, when the board is 
completely independent, the nonredundant contacts bridging 
structural holes between the corporation and the members of 
the board do not exist. The single structural hole is bridged by 
the CEO, who, as the only contact between managers and the 
board, is the board’s sole source of information.102 Unless a 
  
 102 Unless of course the CEO chooses to present insiders at board meetings or 
facilitate their contact with independent board members. It would, it seems, be 
irrational for a CEO to do this because in so doing he relinquishes his informational 
monopoly and the full power of his control position.  
  Of course auditors may provide a source of financial information to the 
board independent of the CEO. But the work of auditors is typically done in 
conjunction with management and, following Sarbanes-Oxley, we can expect the CEO 
to have an active role in the process of preparing audited financial statements. 
Moreover, the corporate scandals of 2002 demonstrated that independent auditors have 
greater incentives to please their employer than to provide truly independent audits. 
While this is likely to change, it only mitigates the problem at issue—it does not 
eliminate it. 
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subordinate manager has independent network ties to one or 
more of the independent directors, only the CEO is in a position 
to control and manipulate information flows to the board. This 
leaves the CEO in an enormously powerful position, with every 
incentive to present information to the board in a light that is 
most favorable to him.103 The board is constrained by the 
information the CEO chooses to present and how he chooses to 
present it.104 Consequently, the CEO in a corporation with an 
independent board should be strong.105 The following figure 
illustrates hypothesis two. 
Figure 8:  Corporations that have independent boards will 
have strong CEOs 
 
 
 
It should therefore come as no surprise that there is 
some (albeit disputed) evidence that CEOs with independent 
boards tend to receive the highest compensation.106 But the 
reason may not be, as some suggest, the board’s lack of 
sophistication with respect to option pricing and a consequent 
  
 103 Langevoort, supra note 5, at 812 discusses the CEO’s incentive to 
manipulate information to outside directors. See also Westphal, supra note 19 
(discussing and analyzing CEO ingratiation and persuasion to offset the power of 
outside directors). 
 104 Westphal, supra note 19, provides empirical support for what he calls 
greater CEO ingratiation and persuasion behavior where the corporation has an 
independent board. Ingratiation and persuasion may not rise to the level of 
manipulation, but they’re not far removed from it. 
 105 This helps to explain the superior bargaining position of the CEO in 
compensation matters observed by Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, as well as suggest 
opportunities for the CEO to engage in what they interestingly describe as 
“camouflaging” his compensation package. Id. at 789. 
 106 The empirical evidence is mixed on whether this is accurate. See supra 
note 23 and accompanying text. 
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tendency to be overly generous with options.107 Instead, the 
reason may be that the independent board is reliant upon the 
CEO for information with respect to his own performance, 
information that can easily be manipulated or suppressed by 
the CEO because of his position as the sole source of 
information.108 This also may explain Bhagat and Black’s 
evidence that independent boards do not necessarily improve 
corporate performance and may in fact make it worse.109 
Finally, and perhaps most powerfully, it may account for one of 
the principal ways in which opportunities for executive 
misbehavior—and resulting corporate scandals—are created. 
As the sole bridge between corporate management and the 
board the CEO is put in an enormously powerful position. He 
has a monopoly over the information delivered to the body 
ultimately responsible for the integrity of corporate 
management and information.110 
At this juncture, it is important to note some 
qualifications. Corporations of any size, and especially public 
corporations, are highly complex. As they face a variety of 
different challenges, there will be exceptions to the hypotheses. 
One clear case, presented in Joy v. North,111 is where a CEO has 
an insider dominated board that he has, by force of personality, 
largely subjugated to his control. Or, a corporation with an 
independent board may have directors who themselves possess 
sufficiently strong personalities as to insist upon verifying the 
information presented by the CEO.112 There are also certain 
  
 107 See Murphy, supra note 14. 
 108 Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker recognize this problem, supra note 5. See also 
Novaes & Zingales, supra note 41 (discussing the relationship between bureaucratic 
structure and compensation arrangements). 
 109 Bhagat & Black, supra note 15, at 263. 
 110 This does not mean that the CEO is unconstrained. Obviously the CEO 
will be dependent for his information on the information supplied to him by his 
subordinates. This can create its own informational problems, as I discuss infra Part 
VI. 
 111 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982). This is likely to be a relatively rare situation. 
Persons—even insiders—who sit on corporate boards tend to be powerful and highly 
successful in their own right, and while psychological theories, as well as studies of 
director selection, suggest that these directors are or become friendly to the CEO, the 
situation in which directors are complete pushovers is unlikely to be frequent. 
 112 This may well be increasingly the case, strong personalities or not, in light 
of the recent corporate scandals in which various boards were accused of failing to pay 
proper attention to internal corporate transactions, like the conflict of interest 
transactions approved by the board in the Enron case. WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR., 107TH 
CONGRESS., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 1-17 (Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter POWERS 
REPORT]. 
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types of transactions, like board-authorized compensation, for 
which an inside board may be beneficial to the CEO 
(particularly if the compensation plan simultaneously benefits 
the senior managers who sit on the board).113 Other types of 
transactions, like takeover situations, may focus the board (at 
least in part because of potential legal sanctions for failing to 
fulfill their duties in highly visible transactions), such that 
they become more demanding of verified information (as, for 
example, in the employment of investment bankers to give 
fairness opinions). And a situation such as a corporation in 
reorganization may result in a grant of extraordinary power to 
the CEO (or result in a new CEO with such power), 
notwithstanding board composition or corporate structure. 
Nonetheless, for ordinary monitoring situations of the type that 
evidently failed in the recent corporate scandals, the 
hypotheses hold as a theoretical matter.114   
Finally, I recognize that in basing the hypotheses on a 
wholly independent board (except of course for the CEO), I am 
relying on an ideal type that may not exist in practice. But 
using the ideal type allows us to clarify the problems an 
independent board faces with respect to the CEO, and 
formulate better questions for analysis.        
V. EXTENDING THE IMPLICATIONS—SENIOR MANAGERS 
It should be apparent that what holds true for the CEO 
has the potential, under the right circumstances, to hold true 
for senior managers. For purposes of this paper, I define senior 
managers as those executives who are the CEO’s immediate 
subordinates and, depending upon the corporation’s internal 
structure, the managers directly below them. 
In order for senior managers to seize the opportunities 
presented by structural holes at the top of the corporate 
structure, at least one of several conditions must exist. One 
potential condition is that the CEO, despite his rank, is a poor 
network player, either because of his inability to recognize 
structural holes or because he has allowed them to proliferate 
  
 113 The evidence on whether independent or inside boards overcompensate 
CEOs is disputed. Even in these circumstances, the CEO’s ability to control 
information about his own performance with respect to an independent board may give 
him an edge. 
 114 I know this is the typical law professor’s cop-out but I am truly unequipped 
to do this kind of empirical work. I do hope, in the not too distant future, to find a way 
to conduct adequate empirical testing of the hypotheses.  
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at high levels. Another is that one or more senior executives 
might collude with the CEO in order to control and manipulate 
information with respect to the board. A third possibility is 
that the CEO intentionally creates structural holes in order to 
separate himself from the manipulation of information and 
control that would then be possible at the senior manager level. 
A final condition would be that the senior executives are good 
network players, with efficient and effective networks within 
the corporate hierarchy, and the ability to identify structural 
hole opportunities. Several examples will illustrate the 
existence of these conditions and the resulting possibilities for 
senior management misconduct. 
The poster child of corporate scandals, the Enron fiasco, 
presents the first example. The facts of the decline and fall of 
Enron are well known. Enron engaged in a number of off-
balance sheet transactions which, contrary to generally 
accepted accounting principles, it failed to disclose, resulting in 
highly overstated earnings and highly understated assets. 
Moreover, some of the transactions engaged in were shams. 
These transactions provided certain executives (most notably 
Andrew Fastow, the corporation’s chief financial officer, and 
some of his subordinates), with opportunities for rich rewards. 
The collapse of Enron resulted in an internal investigation115 
and well-publicized congressional hearings116 which involved 
the testimony of a number of the Enron participants.  
Most striking in both the reports and the hearings were 
CEO Jeff Skilling’s continuous denials of knowledge of the 
transactions, their financial structures, and the extent of 
Fastow’s conflicts of interest and profit opportunities. (Some of 
the transactions took place under the watch of Skilling’s 
predecessor CEO, Kenneth Lay, who refused to testify. The 
Powers report suggests the extent to which Lay may have 
lacked knowledge.)117 Particularly striking was Skilling’s 
congressional testimony, under oath, that he was not aware of 
the mayhem transpiring beneath him in the managerial ranks. 
  
 115 POWERS REPORT, supra note 112. 
 116 The Collapse of the Enron Corporation: Full Committee Hearings Before the 
State Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 107th Cong. Part IV (Feb. 26, 2002) 
(testimony of Jeffrey Skilling).  
 117 The Powers report is critical of the board, which evidently approved certain 
transactions on the basis of incomplete knowledge. POWERS REPORT, supra note 112, at 
1-17. This of course is consistent with the notion that boards lacking strong network 
ties into the corporate hierarchy are more easily manipulated.  
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The Powers report also suggests that Skilling may have been 
uninformed at some level.118  
The common wisdom, I believe, was that Skilling and 
perhaps Lay were lying.119 But it may well be that Skilling was 
telling the truth. How could a chief operating officer (later 
CEO) be so ignorant of what his immediate subordinates were 
doing? One answer is that Skilling, a highly accomplished 
network player, created a structural hole between himself and 
Fastow, which he intentionally left unbridged. This break 
established chains of command and reporting systems designed 
to stop with Fastow. Information would only reach Skilling 
selectively, if at all. If this was the case, it is a superb example 
of how a CEO can create a structural hole in order to protect 
himself from potential liability.  
Why would a CEO do this? In Skilling’s case, the answer 
may be because he needed Fastow’s manipulations in order to 
maintain Enron’s appearance as a highly valuable and 
continually growing corporation. That, after all, is what the off-
balance sheet transactions were designed to do. The price for 
Fastow’s cooperation may well have been the enormous 
compensation he received for his role in managing these 
entities. Assuming Skilling was aware both of Fastow’s skill (as 
he undoubtedly was) and his lack of character, it would have 
been to Skilling’s advantage to allow Fastow to operate as a 
free agent, while Skilling created plausible deniability through 
the creation of a structural hole—severing the link between 
COO (later CEO) and CFO.120  
The financial fraud of MCI/Worldcom presents another 
possibility: senior managers colluding with the CEO. This case 
also presents a nice example of board ignorance as a result of 
managerial manipulation of information. Worldcom (as it is 
  
 118 Id. at 169-72. 
 119 Of course this is not in itself necessarily probative of their lack of 
knowledge; only that the government has yet to make a case. 
 120 This is where Burt’s description of structural holes both as chasms and as 
interlocks creates possibilities for expanding the utility of the theory. The use of 
structural holes in the context described in the text envisions the creation of a chasm 
which remains unfilled despite the fact that presumably both Skilling and Fastow 
perceived the opportunity to fill it. This defensive use of structural holes is not part of 
Burt’s explanation of the theory. It is consistent with the theory I develop here based 
upon Burt’s work.  
  I also do not mean to suggest that as a moral or ethical matter we ought to 
accept Skilling’s denial of knowledge as a legal defense if indeed this is what happened. 
If I am right about the structure, however, it could make it difficult for prosecutors to 
establish a strong case against him.  
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now known), through chief financial officer Scott Sullivan and 
several of his subordinates, simply made up numbers that 
showed higher profits and revenues and lower costs than were 
actually the case. CEO Bernie Ebbers was convicted in 2005 for 
his role in the fraud. Yet it remains unclear how much he 
knew. A jury found that, despite Ebbers’ denial of knowledge, 
he in fact was aware of the fraud and may have participated in 
it.121 As in the case of Enron, the clear purpose of the financial 
fraud was to support and increase the company’s stock price 
despite underlying business conditions that would have in fact 
damaged the company (or at least its stock price) had they been 
properly disclosed.  
To the extent that Ebbers was involved, Worldcom 
presents a paradigmatic example of collusion among the CEO 
and senior managers to take advantage of a structural hole. In 
contrast to the Enron case in which, on my reading, Skilling 
intentionally broke the network tie between himself and 
Fastow, in this case Ebbers and the senior managers involved 
themselves formed a network. This network stopped at the 
CEO and allowed the board to remain in the dark.  
VI. EXTENDING THE THEORY—THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
BOARD STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL CORPORATE 
STRUCTURE 
Thus far my analysis has proceeded as if there were no 
significant differences among managerial systems. In fact there 
are two basic paradigms of internal corporate structure. The 
first is the traditional, hierarchical corporate bureaucracy, the 
development of which is described thoroughly and compellingly 
by Alfred Chandler.122 By this account, American big business 
grew through the first half of the twentieth century as multi-
unit enterprises that, of necessity, employed legions of 
corporate managers at various levels in huge bureaucracies. 
Such bureaucracies persisted well into the end of the century.123  
The second kind of corporate structure is more 
condensed. Less hierarchical corporations rose in prominence 
  
 121 Robert Frank et. al., Executives On Trial: Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 3, 2003, at B1, B4. 
 122 See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). 
 123 See DAVID M. GORDON, FAT AND MEAN: THE CORPORATE SQUEEZE OF 
WORKING AMERICANS AND THE MYTH OF MANAGERIAL “DOWNSIZING” (1996). 
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as the large bureaucracies began to come apart.124 These 
“flatter” corporations are organizations in which layer upon 
layer of middle management has been stripped out, leaving in 
its place a CEO, a number of high level executives on a 
relatively equal level, and several middle level managers above 
the worker. Raghuram Rajan and Julie Wulf, after surveying 
relevant information with respect to more than 300 large 
American corporations over fourteen years, concluded that the 
number of managers reporting directly to the CEO has 
increased, and the levels of managers between the CEO and 
the lowest manager with profit responsibility has decreased. 
The number of managers reporting directly to the CEO 
increased by 61% between 1986 and 1999, while the number of 
positions between the CEO and the lowest manager with profit 
responsibility decreased by 25%. This is clear evidence that 
American corporate hierarchies are flattening.125  
Each organizational type is designed to facilitate the 
flow of information.126 Organizational theorists argue that the 
particular internal structures, or information paths, vary with 
the circumstances of the corporation. Bureaucratic structure 
tends to be found in stable industries where such factors as 
technology, supply, demand, and production are relatively 
predictable and unvarying. In this situation, the bureaucracy 
works precisely because it is designed for control, and control is 
possible and likely efficient because of the predictability of the 
business environment. Control is ensured by the creation of 
rigid hierarchies and separated divisions in which information 
flows up the pyramid to the responsible senior executive. By 
contrast, horizontal structures work best in industrial 
environments, where information and technology are rapidly 
changing, and the need for control is supplanted by the need 
  
 124 This is not to say that there are not a significant number of American 
corporations that still operate as hierarchical bureaucracies—only that they have 
become less dominant in the corporate population and tend to be concentrated in 
certain industries  
 125 Raghuram Rajan & Julie Wulf, The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel 
Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., Apr. 
2003, available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9633.pdf. Rajan and Wulf are 
interested primarily in the effects this trend has had on managerial pay as well as the 
causes of the flattening (which they conclude is due to exogenous pressure in the form 
of technological and environmental changes.) These insights, while obviously 
important, are not especially relevant to the central argument of this paper. 
 126 Nohria & Berkley, supra note 20, at 118 (“Organizations control on the 
basis of knowledge: They are information-processors, or what could be seen in a 
metaphorical sense as a kind of human-based computer.”)  
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for flexibility. Such flexibility is best obtained by loosening the 
bureaucratic hierarchy and allowing information to flow freely 
through the various intracorporate networks. Building upon 
structural hole theory as applied to CEO-board relationships, 
these observations regarding internal corporate structure lead 
me to formulate two additional, although tentative, hypotheses: 
1. Corporations that are structured hierarchically and 
have independent boards will have a moderately weak CEO; 
and 
2. Corporations that are structured horizontally and 
have inside boards will have a moderately strong CEO. 
Before examining the two hypotheses individually, I 
propose four expanded hypotheses that result from the 
conflation of the two theories: 
1. Corporations that are structured hierarchically and 
have inside boards will have a weak CEO; 
2. Corporations that are structured hierarchically and 
have independent boards will have a moderately weak CEO;  
3. Corporations that are structured horizontally and 
have inside boards will have a moderately strong CEO; and 
4. Corporations that are structured horizontally and 
have independent boards will have a strong CEO. 
The hypotheses in this broader iteration can also be 
presented in the form of a matrix: 
 
 
 
 Inside  Independent 
Hierarchical  Weak  Moderately weak 
Horizontal  Moderately strong  Strong 
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I previously explained the two principal hypotheses 
without reference to bureaucratic structure. Let me now 
elaborate the more complex hypothesis. The information flows 
to independent directors from inside directors are likely to be 
substantially richer in bureaucratically-structured corporations 
than in horizontal corporations. In a bureaucratic corporation, 
almost by definition the CEO will have relatively few contacts 
in the corporate hierarchy. That is, he will have relatively few 
subordinates and bridge relatively few structural holes (as 
many structural holes as he has immediate subordinates with 
different responsibilities and therefore different networks). 
Recall that the ideal situation for an actor to exploit his 
information and control opportunities is to maximize the 
number of structural holes he bridges, or to maximize the 
number of his nonredundant network contacts. Bureaucratic 
efficiency implies a chain of command, narrowing to only a few 
immediate subordinates below the CEO. Thus the bureaucratic 
structure provides, at least in an ideal state, few structural 
hole opportunities—few nonredundant contacts—for the CEO. 
Rajan and Wulf’s study found that, indeed, the number 
of subordinates reporting directly to the CEO was significantly 
smaller in a more bureaucratic era. As recently as 1986, the 
median CEO in their study group had 4.4 executives reporting 
directly to him.127 A web of hierarchy extended below these 
executives, networks upon networks. This web of networks goes 
much deeper in a bureaucratic corporation than in a horizontal 
corporation and it broadens considerably as one proceeds down 
the hierarchy from the CEO and his handful of subordinates. 
One implication is that there are a greater number of points 
within the pyramidal hierarchy at which network 
entrepreneurs can exploit structural holes that are likely 
unavailable to the CEO. The opportunities for informational 
and control advantage are pushed further down the chain of 
command to lower level managers. These managers, if they are 
good network entrepreneurs, can exploit these structural hole 
opportunities with the possible result that they can manipulate 
or stop information before it reaches the level of the CEO or his 
immediate subordinates.  
While this argument suggests that top level executives 
who would serve as inside directors also have a limited number 
of direct reporting contacts in the bureaucratic corporation, the 
  
 127 Rajan & Wulf, supra note 125, at 1. 
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issue is more complex. The theory does not necessarily imply 
that the executives’ only contacts in the hierarchy are those 
reporting directly to them (in a way that is probably more 
characteristic of the CEO), and thus that they face 
informational constraints similar to the CEO. On the contrary, 
these mangers are likely to have more subordinates (and thus 
more network contacts) that reach deeper into the hierarchy 
than the CEO. Glenn Carroll and Albert Teo found that higher 
level managers tend on average to have wider social networks 
than do lower level managers, both within and independent of 
the corporation.128 These social networks include other high 
level managers not directly involved in that particular 
manager’s area of expertise, suggesting more horizontal 
networks across the corporation that can serve as crucial 
sources of information.129 Moreover, Burt’s work shows that not 
only do managers’ network sizes increase with rank,130 but that 
in establishing their networks, managers typically choose a 
“strategic partner[],” and that the most effective strategic 
partner tends to be one of their bosses’ boss.131 The implication 
is that higher level managers also have networks that go deep 
into the bureaucratic structure, as lower managers leapfrog the 
middleman and align themselves with higher level managers.132 
The higher the level of manager, therefore, the more likely they 
are to have both broad and deep networks. This line of 
reasoning may also suggest that some second-tier executives 
  
 128 Carroll & Teo, supra note 95. 
 129 The specific position of the CEO is not addressed. But it seems likely, given 
the nature of bureaucratic corporations, that the CEO will be more isolated in the 
executive suite and less likely to have network ties to lower level managers. Moreover, 
given the presumed desire of CEO subordinates to succeed the CEO, one should expect 
these executives to adopt the CEO as their strategic partner (which of course puts the 
CEO in a position to manipulate them in the manner of the law firm associate I earlier 
described). 
 130 BURT, supra note 27, at 125. 
 131 Id. at 146, 150. It is not at all clear, though, that Burt would agree with my 
analysis. Although he doesn’t address the point directly, he does point out that a 
manager with a disorganized work force (which may correlate with my description of 
some horizontal corporations) may be more able to exploit his workers to his advantage 
than the manager of a well-organized work force (which may correlate to my 
description of some bureaucratic corporations). Id. at 189. 
 132 It is, of course, possible that the CEO serves as strategic partner to 
executives below the level of his immediate subordinates and thus establishes network 
contacts for him deeper in the corporate structure than I have suggested in the text. 
But even if there is some depth to CEO contacts in hierarchies, the flattened 
corporation provides more subordinates of the CEO’s subordinates with whom he can 
make contact, thus suggesting that the bureaucratic or flattened structure of the 
corporation should be expected to have an effect on the CEO’s power independent of 
board composition. 
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strategically partner with the CEO, but given the CEO’s 
ultimate responsibility for the corporation and his relatively 
limited time, it may well be more likely that the CEO remains 
relatively isolated in the executive suite. If the CEO’s 
subordinates maximize their nonredundant contacts, they can 
take advantage of the structural hole opportunities to gain 
greater information and control than is available to the CEO.  
All of this suggests that the managers on a level directly 
below the CEO (the managers reporting directly to the CEO) 
are likely to have significant nonredundant network contacts 
that provide them with important information flows. How and 
what they choose to report to the CEO who, theoretically, is 
more constrained, is within their control. The fewer the 
number of executives reporting directly to the CEO, the more 
limited the CEO’s sources of information, and the more control 
maintained by the senior executives. Thus it would appear that 
the CEO’s position in the bureaucratic corporation is highly 
dependent upon the extent to which his immediate 
subordinates refrain from opportunistic use of their 
informational positions, gained through their multiple 
networks which provide them with more structural hole 
opportunities than the CEO. The CEO, in choosing his 
subordinates, must choose effectively—subordinates who are 
trustworthy and reliable—in order to maximize his power 
within the bureaucratic structure and prevent his own 
informational isolation.  
The likely conclusion is that inside directors in a 
bureaucratic corporation are structurally more wired than the 
CEO, and have independent relationships (by virtue of their 
board seats) with independent directors. The insiders’ 
nonredundant contacts—their structural hole opportunities—
are more numerous and likely deeper than those of the CEO. 
Now, the opportunity for critical information to bypass the 
CEO is structurally apparent. Thus, network theory suggests 
that the bureaucratic corporation with insiders on the board is 
likely to have a relatively weak CEO.  Figure Nine illustrates 
this hypothesis. 
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Figure 9:   Corporations that are structured hierarchically 
and have inside boards will have weak CEOs 
 
 
The second hypothesis logically follows from the first. 
Bureaucratic corporations with an independent board are likely 
to have moderately weak CEOs (CEOs that are stronger than 
in the bureaucratic/inside board corporation and weaker than 
CEOs in each configuration of the horizontal corporation). The 
same structural conditions I discussed above with respect to 
the hierarchy continue to exist. This time, however, the CEO’s 
subordinates lack direct ties to the independent directors. 
Information flows through the CEO. The CEO is not in as 
strong a position of informational control as he is in a 
horizontal configuration because his immediate subordinates 
(and therefore network contacts) are still few in number and 
sufficiently connected within the corporation to maintain their 
ability to control and manipulate the flow of information to the 
CEO. But unless they have relationships with at least one 
independent director beyond the context of the particular 
corporation (which is possible if, for example, a chief financial 
officer sits on the board of a corporation on which one of the 
independent directors also sits), they have no informational 
bypass route around the CEO. Thus, whatever the quality and 
completeness of the information the CEO receives, he fills the 
single structural hole between the board and his subordinates 
and is in a position to control and manipulate the information 
received by the board. The structure of the corporation 
suggests that the quality and quantity of information he 
receives will vary with the integrity and loyalty of his 
subordinates, but his position with respect to the board is 
strong. Figure Ten illustrates the hypothesis. 
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Figure 10: Corporations that are structured hierarchically 
and have independent boards will have 
moderately weak CEOs 
 
 
 
Some empirical evidence suggests that this indeed is the 
case. Ranjay Gulati and James Westphal demonstrated 
(through the empirical examination of joint venture formation) 
that “[i]ndependent board control over management may 
actually produce a negative relationship between the CEO and 
the board characterized by a lack of mutual understanding and 
distrust.”133 (This, of course, is consistent with Bhagat and 
Black’s work and the studies cited earlier suggesting that 
independent boards actually impede corporate performance.134) 
Gulati and Westphal attribute this largely to the 
dissatisfaction felt by a CEO who believes he is under 
significant scrutiny by an independent monitoring board. While 
their conclusion with regard to mistrust seems compelling, 
their explanation relies upon psychological motivations that 
are difficult to verify. While the two are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, I present a theory that does not rely on 
speculation, self-reporting, or psychological analysis. The board 
is right to distrust the CEO because the CEO is in a structural 
position to block or manipulate the flow of information to the 
board. This conclusion, as will be clear, has its strongest 
implications for hypothesis four. 
The third hypothesis introduces the horizontal 
corporation, a structure that has continued to proliferate over 
the last several decades. The bureaucratic corporation derives 
  
 133 Gulati & Westphal, supra note 21, at 477, 498. 
 134 See Bhagat & Black, supra note 15, and supra text accompanying notes 15, 
17, 23, and 105.  
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from the traditional, Taylorist-inspired,135 pyramidal structures, 
consisting of line workers to legions of middle managers to 
Janissary corps of junior executives to the chosen few in the 
executive suite and, ultimately, the CEO. This structure has, in 
many industries (and to some extent within industries) 
significantly flattened. Instead of pyramidal hierarchies, we 
are now more likely to see corporations that have stripped out 
much of the middle managerial ranks and spread the executive 
power over a larger horizontal range of senior managers, who 
report not to the CEO’s subordinates, but to the CEO directly. 
Rajan and Wulf found that the average number of senior 
managers reporting directly to the CEO had increased by 61%, 
from 4.4 to 7.2, between 1986 and 1999.136 
In the horizontal corporation, the managerial levels 
below the top executives are dramatically reduced and the 
number of executives reporting directly to the CEO is 
significantly increased. From the standpoint of structural 
holes, the consequences are immediately apparent. While the 
CEO’s subordinates may still retain some informational control 
based upon their networks, two things change. First, those 
networks are considerably reduced in size. The manager has 
fewer subordinates, and the manager’s subordinates have 
fewer subordinates. Even if, as a consequence, the manager’s 
network becomes flatter (i.e. managers at the same level will 
interact in networks),137 their ability to control information 
flows to the CEO is considerably diminished. This is because 
the number of contacts the CEO has into the various networks 
within the corporation corresponds with the number of 
executives reporting to him. In other words, he bridges more 
structural holes than he does in the hierarchical corporation. 
Unless one assumes that the executives will collude to restrict 
the information flow to the CEO,138 the CEO will have 
  
 135 See generally FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC 
MANAGEMENT (1911); Nohria & Berkley, supra note 20, 108-26. The classic work on the 
large, multi-divisional bureaucracy is of course ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE 
HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). 
 136 Rajan & Wulf, supra note 125, at 1. But see GORDON, supra note 123, for 
an argument that bureaucracies which flatten as the result of significant layoffs in the 
middle management ranks relatively quickly re-establish their hierarchies through 
rehirings. 
 137 This situation, by the way, has been found by Burt to be most 
advantageous to managers in their ability to take advantage of structural holes. Burt, 
supra note 62. 
 138 This is possible, but unlikely, given the normal ambitions of second-level 
executives eventually to ascend to a CEO position either in their own or another 
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materially greater informational opportunities. Moreover, 
when applying this theory to the ideal model of the horizontal 
corporation, each of these senior executives performs different 
functions, and has access to (and reports to the CEO) different 
types of information. As the number of CEO subordinates 
multiplies, the diffusion of job descriptions is likely to increase. 
The result is that the CEO is increasingly able to receive, 
convey, and control information—not to mention manipulate 
his subordinates against one another.139 Thus we should expect 
that the CEO in the horizontal structure is, counterintuitively, 
more powerful than the CEO in a bureaucratic organization 
with either an inside or an independent board. Hypothesis 
three is illustrated in Figure Eleven. 
 
  
corporation which makes them in large part dependent upon the good will of their own 
CEO. Raymond T. Sparrowe and Robert C. Liden, combining sociological exchange 
theory which looks at the quality of relationships, and network theory, which looks at 
the structure of relationships, suggest that “where the timing and equivalence of 
returns is indefinite and the interest of the exchange partners is cooperative,” the 
exchange relationship (as between CEO and immediate subordinate) is likely to be 
cooperative and competition (of the manipulative sort described in the text) is likely to 
be contrary to group norms. In contrast, structural holes are “characterized by 
immediacy and equivalence of returns and mutual self-interest”—in other words, 
competition, which (in my view) is only to be expected given the fact that structural 
holes are definitionally competitive. Raymond T. Sparrowe & Robert C. Liden, Process 
and Structure in Leader-Member Exchange, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 522, 532 (1997). If 
this is true, one might reasonably ask whether the CEO-subordinate relationship 
which, after all, is characterized by structural holes, is just as likely to be competitive 
and manipulative as the CEO-board relationship, which is also characterized by 
structural holes. I suspect that the answer is not, because the CEO-subordinate 
relationship is not itself competitive. That is to say, there is only one CEO, and while 
subordinates might fight to succeed him (establishing competitive relationships at the 
subordinate level which further destroys the incentives for them to collude in 
withholding information from the CEO), they are reliant upon his good will and high 
opinion (at least as long as the CEO is successful) for their chances to be named 
successor. 
 139 Burt also notes that this kind of structure, in which managers have few or 
no peers, increases the value of social capital to them in terms of their chances of 
promotion. This is true for bureaucratic organizations, but in network organizations (or 
horizontal corporations) it is also valuable to managers with multiple peers. Burt, 
supra note 62. This observation is not especially significant for my argument because 
in the stylized firm I’ve created each CEO subordinate can only rise within the firm by 
becoming CEO. But there is a highly important implication of this analysis which is 
most relevant to hypothesis four. The structure puts them in the position of monopolist 
over the kinds of work they do. The CEO is, in this analysis, the ultimate monopolist, 
since nobody in the corporation does the work of the CEO, and it is the ability to use 
this monopoly position (which would be constrained by inside directors) that gives him 
the greatest power. 
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Figure 11: Corporations that are structured horizontally 
and have inside boards will have moderately 
strong CEOs 
 
A qualification is in order. If bureaucratic organizations 
are built for control, horizontal organizations are built for 
freedom. Information flows are significantly less constrained in 
a horizontal organization, as are relationships defined by 
position. Freedom is the opportunity provided by structural 
holes. The implication is that in the horizontal organization, 
managers are freer to establish their own networks across the 
corporation, and thus skillful network entrepreneurs can 
achieve a level of informational control that is more widespread 
than is likely in the more constrained bureaucracy. In such a 
case, the network entrepreneur could be in a better position to 
control broader information flows to the CEO and his 
immediate subordinates, and thus the CEO would be 
weakened. While I believe that the CEO’s greater access into 
the network structures of the horizontal corporation is likely to 
give him greater power, this is not certain, and the hypothesis 
remains tentative. 
The key variable now becomes the board. If the board 
has insiders as well as independent directors, the CEO’s 
position is likely to be weakened because, as in hypothesis one, 
the presence of insiders on the board gives network contacts to 
the independents into the corporate networks by virtue of their 
contacts with the insiders. In light of the CEO’s strong 
structural position in the horizontal corporation (with his own 
multiple nonredundant contacts into the corporation’s 
networks), the independent directors’ ability to circumvent the 
CEO will be reduced. It will not be entirely eliminated, because 
opportunistic senior managers hypothetically working in 
different aspects of the business might take advantage of their 
board positions to manipulate the independents. The risk of 
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detection by the CEO, however, is increased: the senior 
managers’ corporate responsibilities are more distinct, 
therefore the CEO’s ability to discern the source of information 
that bypasses him will be improved. Thus, in hypothesis three, 
we can expect the CEO in the horizontal corporation with an 
inside board to be stronger than the CEO in a bureaucratic 
corporation, but not as strong as he might be were the board 
composed solely of independent directors as in hypothesis four. 
My conclusions are tentative with respect to the four 
restated hypotheses that address both board structure and 
bureaucratic structure, and require further study. As I noted 
earlier, corporations are highly varied in their internal 
organizations despite the existence of distinct and identifiable 
patterns. It may be that in a particular bureaucracy, CEO 
control is so tight that defection in the form of information 
blockage or distortion at lower levels is unlikely. But if true, it 
is most likely to be true in a corporation that does business in a 
single location. Burt found that in a corporation with multiple 
and geographically dispersed business operations, managers 
whose jobs put them at the “frontiers,” i.e., required them to be 
in contact with managers in other locations, had greater 
structural hole opportunities than managers whose 
responsibilities were confined to a single location. Thus the 
tightly controlled bureaucracy of the Taylorist model may be 
increasingly rare. 
At the same time, as I noted earlier, horizontal 
corporations are designed to permit freer and less structured 
information flows. In terms of network theory, the networks 
are not as constrained by bureaucratic structure. As a result, it 
may well be that greater structural hole opportunities exist in 
these corporations because the diffusion of job responsibility 
implied by the horizontal structure creates internal frontiers 
which enable even managers working in the same location to 
identify more numerous structural holes. Since structural holes 
are opportunities to receive, control, and manipulate 
information, it may be the case that in the horizontal 
corporation the CEO will be less well informed than in the 
bureaucratic corporation. On the other hand, the broader and 
shallower management structure of the horizontal corporation 
suggests that the likelihood of detecting informational blockage 
and manipulation is greater than in the hierarchical structure, 
with potentially dire consequences for those acting 
opportunistically to the disadvantage of the corporation or the 
CEO. 
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Because of the uncertain affect of the internal corporate 
structure on information flows, these hypotheses are tentative. 
For the time being, I suggest that bureaucratic structure be 
seen as an independent variable that magnifies the effects of 
the presence of an inside or independent board. While this 
variable is not likely to have as substantial an explanatory 
impact as do the simpler hypotheses stated at the outset, it 
merits additional consideration and empirical research. 
VII.  MOVING BEYOND THE BOARD IN CORPORATE LAW 
REFORM 
Almost since the advent of the modern corporation, 
corporate scholars have focused on the board of directors as the 
body most capable of protecting the corporation and its 
stockholders from managerial depredation. Beginning in the 
1980s, the reform effort increasingly focused on the importance 
of independent directors as the solution to this monitoring 
problem. Recent evidence, however, suggests that the resulting 
changes in corporate boards have not been entirely beneficial. 
For example, the CEO of a corporation with an independent 
board has the ability to distort his compensation and the 
corporation’s broader compensation structure in ways that are 
disadvantageous to the corporation. Structural hole theory 
provides an explanation for these phenomena, as well as for the 
recent corporate scandals that occurred beneath the boards’ 
radar screens. Independent boards magnify CEO power. Since 
independent boards have been the consensus solution after 
almost a century of attempts at board reform, this traditional 
focus on the board of directors is misplaced. Instead, 
governance scholars must begin to study the internal workings 
of the corporation, and how these networks link to the CEO, 
senior executives, and the board, if they are to devise effective 
solutions to problems of corporate governance. 
One specific application relates directly to the current 
state of the law on board monitoring. In the widely discussed 
opinion in In re Caremark International,140 the Chancellor 
represents the boards’ obligation as the duty to create 
information flows in both directions (from the board as to 
corporate policy and from the bureaucracy as to compliance 
  
 140 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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information).141 My argument suggests that in order to fulfill 
this duty, it cannot be enough for the board simply to establish 
lines of reporting. Structural holes, which provide 
opportunities to block or distort information throughout the 
hierarchy up to and including the CEO, must be identified in 
order for the board effectively to monitor the flow and accuracy 
of corporate information. Monitoring information flows is only 
effective when one accurately identifies the network nodes that 
are the corporate actors who bridge structural holes and thus 
control the flow of information. In the absence of attention to 
internal structure, monitoring will have limited utility: the 
more limited the more independent the board. 
The point of this paper is not, at this early stage, to 
prescribe specific corporate reforms. While the theory is 
powerful, reform must rest upon empirical evidence. Instead, I 
suggest that certain paths of research must be investigated in 
order to achieve effective corporate reform. The debate over 
board function has been one of manager versus monitor, with 
the latter clearly victorious. Although I do not suggest that the 
board as an institution is irrelevant, my argument raises the 
question, starkly, of the board’s utility. While others have 
proposed alternative conceptions of the board,142 my theory 
indicates the difficulty in evaluating, much less prescribing, 
the board’s function and composition without an inquiry into 
the relationship between the board and the internal structure 
of the corporation. I have presented the theory as a general 
one, as it would be useful first to study it that way, although 
individual corporate evaluation may ultimately be necessary. It 
will likely be found that one size doesn’t fit all. 
At least as important, my hypotheses suggest that we 
take a hard look at the role of the CEO and senior managers. 
In recent years in particular, CEOs of major corporations have 
developed something of a “rock star” quality, followed by the 
popular press, lionized in success while derided in defeat. No 
doubt this has contributed to CEO self-image, if not actual 
power. But board reform without attention to the role and 
power of the CEO and the corporation’s internal managerial  
 
 
  
 141 I have elsewhere argued that the opinion is disingenuous, see Mitchell, 
supra note 38, but it is the articulated state of the law.  
 142 See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 14 (suggesting a dual board); Fisch, supra note 
14 (suggesting individually tailored boards). 
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structure is a fruitless endeavor. Corporate law scholars have, 
with rare exceptions, ignored this critical aspect of corporate 
governance. Attention should turn to this subject. 
